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INTRODUCTION1 
                                                     
1
Parts of this chapter are published in Desmet, C., Fias, W., & Brass, M. (2011). 
Performance monitoring at the task and the response level. Reviews in the 
Neurosciences, 22(5), 575-581. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Errors are key features of human functioning, or as Seneca the 
Younger phrased it in Ancient Rome, “Errare humanum est (to err is 
human).” Typically, errors have a negative connotation, likely due to their 
potentially severe consequences (imagine car accidents, plane crashes, or 
even nuclear disasters). Yet errors play a vital role in our daily lives by 
signaling that a given behaviour is no longer appropriate, or that adjustments 
are needed; again, citing Seneca the Younger, “Errare humanum est, 
perseverare diabolicum (to err is human but to persist diabolical).” In recent 
decades, innumerable studies on error monitoring have emerged (for reviews 
see Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Ullsperger & 
von Cramon, 2004). Based on the above, this is not surprising. Examining 
error instances can illuminate how we achieve constant updating of our 
behaviour in a rapidly changing environment. Further, by studying errors we 
may determine the boundaries of human functioning, thereby preventing 
human disasters.  
In the laboratory, a range of stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) 
tasks such as the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) or the Simon task 
(Simon, 1969) have been frequently used to study errors. Typically in such 
tasks, a conflict at the response level occurs. In other words, participants 
have to execute a response while irrelevant information interferes with this 
correct response. For example, in the flanker task the direction of a central 
arrow has to be determined (left or right). Conflict occurs when the 
surrounding arrows, which should be ignored by the participant, point in the 
opposite direction and consequently activate the wrong response. During 
such instances of response conflict, response errors arise more frequently 
than in non-conflicting situations (i.e., situations in which all arrows point in 
the same direction). Thus, response errors and response conflict are typically 
studied within the same experiments.  
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The aim of the current dissertation is to broaden the point of view 
from which errors and conflict are studied. I will do this in three ways: First, 
we will extend the level from which errors and conflict are studied; rather 
than focusing solely on the response level, we will also study errors and 
conflict at the task level. Secondly, we will examine whether the error- and 
conflict-related effects usually described in laboratory tasks might be 
replicated when using more complex tasks, such as those encountered in 
daily life. Finally, we will investigate whether we use our internal error-
monitoring network for understanding errors we did not commit ourselves, 
but merely observed. In particular, we will examine whether the same brain 
regions are involved when observing human errors and machine errors. 
Below, I will broadly outline previous research conducted on error 
processing. Thereafter, I will discuss the three research lines in more detail.     
ERROR PROCESSING: CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
BEHAVIOURAL CORRELATES OF ERROR AND CONFLICT PROCESSING 
At a behavioural level, several robust post-error and post-conflict 
effects have been documented. First, it has been observed that participants 
are slower following an error than after a correct response (e.g., Laming, 
1968; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). Post-error slowing has served as evidence 
for an adjustment in control following an error. That is, after an error 
participants will shift their position on the speed-accuracy trade off to a 
more conservative level to avoid further errors. Specifically, this should 
result in slower (i.e., post-error slowing) and more accurate responses. Early 
investigations of error processing indeed showed that participants’ response 
times sped up on trials before an error and slowed following an erroneous 
trial (Brewer & Smith, 1984; Brewer & Smith, 1989). Although post-error 
slowing is a very robust phenomenon, it is not always accompanied by post-
error accuracy increases (e.g., Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; Hajcak 
& Simons, 2008; King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010). Some 
authors even found post-error accuracy decreases (e.g., Fiehler, Ullsperger, 
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& von Cramon, 2005; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). These observations 
question the fact that errors result in changes on the speed-accuracy trade 
off. Along the same line, patient studies have shown dissociations between 
post-error slowing and other markers of error processing (Gehring & Knight, 
2000; Mathalon, Fedor, Faustman, Gray, Askari, & Ford, 2002; Modirrousta 
& Fellows, 2008). Based on the above, it has recently been suggested that 
post-error slowing can be seen as an attentional effect rather than as a 
control effect (Notebaert, Houtman, Van Opstal, Gevers, Fias, & Verguts, 
2009; Núñez Castellar, Kuhn, Fias, & Notebaert, 2010). These authors 
showed that post-error slowing was only observed when errors were 
infrequent. When errors were frequent, post-error speeding rather than post-
error slowing occurred. Slowing was even observed after irrelevant 
infrequent sounds (Notebaert et al., 2009). According to this view, post-
error slowing is thus not related to the erroneous nature of an event, but 
rather to the unexpectedness that orients attention away from the current 
task (Notebaert et al., 2009). This was further confirmed when the described 
behavioural pattern was shown to be reflected in an event related potential 
(ERP) component related to attention (P3), and not in ERP’s related to error 
processing (error related negativity (ERN) and feedback related negativity 
(FRN)) (Núñez Castellar et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, a well-established finding regarding post-conflict 
processing is the conflict adaptation effect. This refers to reduced 
interference effects after conflict trials compared with no conflict trials. This 
effect, first described by Gratton and colleagues in the flanker task, has been 
interpreted as a cognitive control effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). 
Namely, a conflict trial will require more control, resulting in a smaller 
interference effect on the next trial. The conflict adaptation effect has been 
replicated in a wide range of tasks (Simon tasks: Sturmer, Leuthold, 
Soetens, Schroter, & Sommer, 2002, Stroop tasks: Kerns, Cohen, 
MacDonald, Cho, Stenger, & Carter, 2004, and prime-target congruency 
effects: Kunde, 2003). However, it has been questioned whether this effect 
is a marker of cognitive control or the result of stimulus and response 
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repetition and alternation effects (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, 
Awh, & Laurey, 2003; Nieuwenhuis, Stins, Posthuma, Polderman, 
Boomsma, & de Geus, 2006). Recently, these two opposing views were 
integrated in the ‘adaptation by binding’ account (Verguts & Notebaert, 
2009). This account formulates cognitive control as a combination of 
arousal and binding processes. Moreover, an instance of conflict is seen as 
resulting in a higher state of arousal, causing a strengthening of the currently 
activated representations.  
FUNCTIONAL NEURO-ANATOMY OF ERROR AND CONFLICT PROCESSING 
At a neural level, a negative deflection occurring 50 ms after the onset 
of a response error has been well documented. This event-related potential 
(ERP) component is assumed to reflect conflict between concurring 
responses (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) or to signal an 
outcome that is worse than expected (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) and has been 
labeled the error related negativity (ERN). Further, the rostral cingulate zone 
(RCZ) has been suggested to be the main generator of the ERN 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001). Other ERP 
components related to error processing are the FRN (feedback related 
negativity) (Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997) and the Pe (error positivity) 
(Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001; Ridderinkhof, 
Ramautar, & Wijnen, 2009). In recent years, electrophysiological studies on 
error processing have expanded rigorously. However, since the neuro-
anatomical research in this thesis will be conducted via fMRI methods, we 
will further focus on research results obtained with this measure. 
Different regions of the prefrontal cortex have been associated with 
error and conflict processing, such as the anterior insula (e.g., Klein, 
Endrass, Kathmann, Neumann, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2007) and the 
lateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., Edwards, Calhoun, & Kiehl, 2012). However, 
the most documented region associated with error processing is situated in 
the posterior and medial part of the prefrontal cortex, further named the 
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posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC). This region extends dorsally 
from the AC-PC line, a line connecting the anterior and posterior 
commissures. Anteriorly, the region extends from the VCA line, a vertical 
line running through the anterior commissure and perpendicular to the AC-
PC line. The Brodmann areas (BAs) typically associated with the pMPFC 
are BA 6, BA 8, BA 9, BA 32 and BA 24 (see Figure 1). The posterior 
border of the pMPFC can also be marked by a subregion labeled the 
presupplementary motor area (preSMA). The preSMA is located in 
Brodmann area 6 and is distinguished by the VCA line from the more 
motor-related SMA (Picard & Strick, 1996). Although activation associated 
with response errors and response conflict extends widely along the pMPFC, 
the core cluster of error and conflict activity is found in the rostral cingulate 
zone (RCZ) (for reviews see Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von 
Cramon, 2004). According to Picard and Strick (1996) the RCZ extends 
anteriorly from the VCA line and is primarily situated in BA 32 extending 
ventrally in BA 24 and dorsally in BA 8 and BA 6. For an overview of the 
anatomical labels see Figure 1. 
Whether there is an anatomical dissociation in the pMPFC between 
errors and conflict is still an open issue. Some studies have shown that the 
RCZ is activated both by errors and conflict (Carter, Braver, Barch, 
Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 1998; Kerns et al., 2004). However, others have 
reported a distinction in the pMPFC between errors and conflict. These 
latter studies showed more ventral areas related to response errors and more 
dorsal areas of the pMPFC related to response conflict (Braver, Barch, Gray, 
Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Kiehl, Liddle, & Hopfinger, 2000; Ullsperger & 
von Cramon, 2001; Wittfoth, Kustermann, Fahle, & Herrmann, 2008). The 
meta-analysis of Ridderinkhof and colleagues (2004) suggests that while 
activity related to error processing tends to cluster more in BA 32 and BA 
24, activity related to response conflict clusters more in BA 8. This relation 
is in accordance with the connections of the pMPFC to motor output. In 
particular, ventral parts of the pMPFC are more related to the primary motor 
cortex and the spinal cord whereas dorsal parts are connected to brain 
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regions related to high-level motor cognition (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 
2001; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004). Since errors trigger the tendency to 
perform the correct response it seems plausible that they are more related to 
regions correlated with motor output than response conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Midsaggital view of the pMPFC bordered by the VCA line and the AC-PC line. 
Two subregions of the pMPFC are indicated; preSMA is presented in green, RCZ is presented 
in blue. Brodmann areas are indicated with their corresponding number.  
 
CURRENT MODELS OF ERROR AND CONFLICT PROCESSING 
Different computational models have been proposed to account for 
the relation between errors, conflict and pMPFC activity. Hereafter, we will 
discuss briefly the most prominent models. The reinforcement learning 
theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) states that when outcomes are worse than 
expected, the mesencephalic dopamine system passes a negative 
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reinforcement learning signal to the RCZ. These signals are then used to 
improve task performance. This theory predicts RCZ activity for errors and 
for other negative unexpected events, such as negative feedback, which has 
since been confirmed (Holroyd et al., 2004).  
A second influential theory incorporates the role of response 
conflict by stating that the pMPFC, and in particular the RCZ, is involved in 
monitoring situations of response conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001). In other 
words, whenever two responses compete, the RCZ will be activated. In this 
view response errors are special cases of response conflict, since errors 
represent a conflict between the correct and the wrong response. According 
to the conflict monitoring theory no anatomical dissociation should be 
perceived between response conflict and response errors.  
These two theories are combined in the error likelihood prediction 
account (Brown & Braver, 2005). This theory presumes that neurons in the 
pMPFC learn to predict the likelihood that an error will occur. Moreover, 
through experience the pMPFC learns to associate certain task context with 
the likelihood that an error will occur based on dopaminergic signals. 
According to this view, conflict situations will also enhance pMPFC activity 
by signaling increased error likelihood. However, other researchers were 
unable to obtain corroborative evidence for this account (Nieuwenhuis, 
Schweizer, Mars, Botvinick, & Hajcak, 2007). 
Other theories have related pMPFC functioning to action 
consequences (Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004) and 
anticipation of the need for control (Aarts, Roelofs, & Van Turennout, 2008; 
Fan et al., 2007; Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger, & Carter, 2000).   
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BEYOND THE RESPONSE LEVEL: TASK CONFLICT AND TASK ERRORS 
Thus far, we have described literature concerning errors and conflict 
at a response level. However, conflict does not only occur at the response 
level but can also occur at the task level. Surprisingly, the literature on task 
conflict is completely separated from the literature on response conflict. 
Two large domains of task conflict studies can be distinguished. First, 
several authors have used the Stroop paradigm (Macleod, 1991; Stroop, 
1935) to study processes related to task conflict. In the Stroop task 
participants are required to name the colour in which a word is printed while 
ignoring the meaning of the word (which is also a colour). In a conflict 
situation the meaning of the word and the colour in which it is printed will 
not correspond. In other words, a conflict at a task level emerges (word 
naming versus colour naming) (Monsell, Taylor, & Murphy, 2001). Brain 
regions associated with these situations of conflict are the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) and the presupplementary motor area (preSMA) (Aarts, 
Roelofs, & van Turennout, 2009; Milham & Banich 2005; Woodward, 
Metzak, Meier, & Holroyd, 2008). It should be noted, though, that in these 
paradigms an influence of response related conflict cannot be ruled out 
entirely because the two tasks (colour naming and word naming) share the 
same responses (for example green and red). This issue was addressed by 
van Veen and Carter (2005). They also used a Stroop task but mapped two 
colours on one response (for example the colours red and yellow should be 
answered by pressing the left button). In this way they could disentangle 
task conflict from response conflict. More precisely, the colour naming task 
and the word naming task could indicate different outcomes while at a 
response level no conflict is apparent (the same response button is required 
for both tasks). These authors found a more dorsal part of the pMPFC 
activated by task conflict (defined as semantic conflict in their study) than 
by response conflict. Recent attempts showed that, by means of an ex-
Gaussian distribution analysis, both types of conflict could be separated in 
the Stroop task (Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009). 
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A different class of paradigms investigating task conflict are task 
switching paradigms (Monsell, 2003). In these paradigms people perform 
two tasks randomly or in a predetermined order. A robust finding in task 
switching experiments is switch costs. That is, longer response times and 
more errors occur on task switch trials relative to task repetition trials (e.g., 
Monsell, 2003). In task switching studies, adaptive behaviour at the task 
level is thus related to the control processes needed to alternate between 
different tasks. Many studies have found a fronto-parietal network to be 
involved in task switching. This network includes the left inferior frontal 
junction, the left posterior superior parietal lobule (Ruge, Brass, Koch, 
Rubin, Meiran, & von Cramon, 2005), regions along the inferior frontal 
sulcus, the left intraparietal sulcus, the anterior insula (Dove, Pollmann, 
Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000), the ACC (Hyafil, Summerfield, 
& Koechlin, 2009) and the preSMA (Brass & von Cramon, 2002; Crone, 
Wendelken, Donohue, & Bunge, 2006; Rushworth, Hadland, Paus, & Sipila, 
2002). Importantly, task switching does not only require resolution of 
conflict at the task level but also involves other processes such as goal 
setting and response related processes (e.g. Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 
2001). Therefore the task switching paradigm does not provide a pure 
measure of task conflict. 
In sum, research on adaptation at the response level has 
concentrated on response conflict and response errors, typically measured in 
SRC tasks. Likewise, conflict at the task level has been studied with Stroop 
and task switching paradigms. Yet surprisingly, to our knowledge no brain 
imaging study has investigated the neural correlates of task errors. Thus far, 
only behavioural studies have addressed this issue. Steinhauser and Hübner 
(2006) compared switch effects after response errors with switch effects 
after task errors. They observed normal switch costs after response errors. 
However, after task errors switch benefits rather than switch costs emerged. 
The authors explained this finding by arguing that at the moment of a task 
error the wrong task is strongly activated. Consequently, subsequent task 
switches will actually represent task repetitions and therefore switch 
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benefits instead of switch costs appear after a task error. In further 
experiments Steinhauser and Hübner (2006) confirmed that the moment of 
response execution is crucial for task strengthening to occur. More 
specifically, they demonstrated switch costs after corrected task errors but 
switch benefits after detected but uncorrected task errors. As mentioned 
above, task errors have never been investigated at the neural level. Given the 
extensive debate regarding the similarity/dissimilarity between response 
errors and response conflict this is very surprising. From a neuro-anatomical 
perspective it is not clear whether one would expect a dissociation of task 
and response errors. On the one hand, there are overlapping brain areas for 
response and task processing (i.e., the RCZ); on the other hand there are also 
brain areas uniquely related to task processing.  
In chapter two, we will establish a design that permits us to study 
task and response errors in one experiment. More precisely, we will adjust a 
typical task switching paradigm. First, we will use univalent stimulus-
response mappings instead of bivalent stimulus-response mappings. In this 
way we can infer from the subjects’ responses which errors were made. 
Second, we will include two manipulations to increase the rate of task and 
response errors, providing additional evidence for the theory proposed by 
Steinhauser and Hübner (2006). More precisely, we will replicate their 
behavioural dissociation and provide further knowledge concerning the role 
of task preparation on switch costs. However, as this was not the primary 
aim of the dissertation we will elaborate more on this issue in the general 
discussion. In chapter three we will use the paradigm developed in chapter 
two to study the neural correlates associated with task errors, task conflict, 
response errors and response conflict.  
ERROR AND CONFLICT PROCESSING IN THE LABORATORY 
So far, we have given an overview of studies on conflict and error 
processing at the task and the response level. However, nearly all these 
studies investigate very simple tasks that have limited ecological validity. As 
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outlined above, conflict and/or error processing has been studied in different 
spatial and non-spatial compatibility tasks such as the flanker task, the 
Stroop task and the Simon task. Although a wide range of paradigms have 
been used, adaptive behaviour in such simplified tasks is restricted to very 
specific strategies. In the flanker task, for example, an error occurs when the 
central arrow is categorized incorrectly. The only possible strategy to 
prevent this error in subsequent trials is to pay more attention to the central 
arrow. However, in many real life situations an error will not only cause an 
increase in attention, but will also provide information that can be used to 
optimize further behaviour. When mastering an activity such as dancing or 
playing a musical instrument, it is very crucial to learn from errors, in the 
sense that one needs to analyze what is going wrong. This learning aspect of 
errors is somewhat neglected in typical laboratory tasks. As a consequence, 
current accounts of error monitoring might underestimate the cognitive 
operations following error detection.  
In chapter four we will address this issue by examining post-error 
and post-conflict effects in a task that is more cognitively challenging than 
simple laboratory tasks, namely mental arithmetic. The results of chapter 
four can provide further insights into the debate outlined in the previous 
section. Classical accounts of error monitoring have described post-error 
slowing as an adaptive effect (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001) whereas recent 
research (i.e., the orienting account) has suggested that post-error slowing 
can be rather seen as an attentional effect (Notebaert et al., 2009). This latter 
theory was developed in respect to the finding that performance does not 
always improve after errors. At first glance, these views seem irreconcilable; 
however, we believe both views can hold true dependent on the context. 
More precisely, when encountered with a simple laboratory task where 
adjustments in behaviour are very restricted, the orienting account might be 
better suited to explain the data. That is, we slow down due to a surprise 
reaction, but since we cannot do much to improve our performance we do 
not perform better on subsequent trials. However, when encountered with a 
task that is more cognitive challenging and where multiple adaptation 
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strategies are possible, the classical theories might better explain the data 
pattern. Furthermore, we slow down after an infrequent erroneous event and 
we use the information provided by the error to change our subsequent 
behaviour.  
OBSERVING ERRORS 
In the last chapter of this dissertation we will focus on error 
observation. To function properly in our social world it is crucial to observe 
and interpret what others are doing. In particular, it can be important to 
identify the errors of others so that we might anticipate them.  
Recent neuroscientific research has documented that the same 
region involved in error processing, namely the pMPFC (Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004), is also involved when observing 
errors in others. The activation of the pMPFC has been reported for error 
observation in laboratory tasks (Shane, Stevens, Harenski, & Kiehl, 2008) as 
well as for error observation in real life situations (Manthey, Schubotz, & 
von Cramon, 2003). Further, error observation both in competitive and 
cooperative social interactions elicits pMPFC activity (de Bruijn, de Lange, 
von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2009; Newman-Norlund, Ganesh, van Schie, de 
Bruijn, & Bekkering, 2009). It thus seems that executing and observing 
errors relies on similar neural mechanisms. However, until now, it remains 
unclear what is the underlying reason for this shared brain system.   
Shared brain activity for observation and execution has been 
reported for actions in general (for reviews see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). An influential theory resulting from 
these findings is that action understanding takes place by means of internal 
motor simulation (Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, Mazziotta, 
& Rizzolatti, 2005; Rizzolati & Craighero, 2004; Rizolatti, Fogassi, & 
Gallese, 2001). If one considers error observation as a particular case of 
action observation, it is very tempting to assume that we also simulate each 
other’s errors and therefore activate the same brain region during error 
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execution and error observation. In chapter five we will test this prediction 
by contrasting brain activity related to the observation of errors that can be 
simulated with brain activity related to the observation of errors that cannot 
be simulated. More precisely, we will use functional brain imaging while 
participants observe human-machine interactions in daily life that result in 
correct or erroneous situations. The reason for these errors can be twofold. 
First, the human caused the error by incorrectly operating the machine 
(human error). Second, the error could be caused by a malfunctioning of the 
machine (machine error). If the simulation hypothesis holds we should only 
find pMPFC activity in the human error condition and not in the machine 
error condition.  
Beyond the distinction between machine and human errors, this 
latter study can provide further information considering the ventral-dorsal 
debate outlined in the first section. Moreover, the idea proposed regarding 
response errors and response conflict (i.e., since response errors are related 
to a motor response they will elicit more ventral parts of the pMPFC than 
response conflict) can be applied to the distinction between error execution 
and error observation. That is, since observed errors will not trigger a motor 
response, activity related to observed errors should be more dorsally located 
compared to activity related to executed errors. Based on a comparison 
between coordinates taken from chapter three and chapter five we are able 
to test this prediction. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
PREPARING OR EXECUTING THE WRONG TASK: THE 
INFLUENCE ON SWITCH EFFECTS1 
 
In a previous study it was proposed that executing a task leads to 
task strengthening. In other words, task activation at the moment of 
response execution determines subsequent switch effects (Steinhauser & 
Hübner, 2006). The authors investigated this issue by comparing switch 
effects after task and response errors. However, the use of bivalent stimulus-
response mappings might have obscured some of the effects. Therefore, we 
replicated the experiment using univalent stimulus-response mappings. With 
this adjusted design, that overcomes some shortcomings of the original 
study, we were able to replicate the finding of switch benefits after task 
errors. Closer inspection of the data showed the importance of pre-
execution processes on subsequent switch effects. In a second experiment we 
further elaborated on these pre-execution processes. More precisely, we 
investigated the effect of task preparation on subsequent switch effects. 
Taken together, our data extent current accounts of task switching by 
showing that the preparatory processes occurring before the response on 
trial n influence the switch cost on trial n + 1. 
                                                     
1
Desmet, C., Fias, W., & Brass, M. (in press). Preparing or executing the wrong task: 
the influence on switch effects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In task switching experiments a slowing in response times and the 
commission of more errors on task switch trials compared to task repetition 
trials is labeled the switch cost (Monsell, 2003). In a previous study 
Steinhauser and Hübner (2006) proposed the so called response based 
strengthening (RBS) account to explain the switch cost. According to this 
account, a strengthening of task-response associations takes place at the 
moment of task execution or response production and in this way affects 
subsequent performance. The authors found evidence for this theory by 
observing switch benefits instead of switch costs after task errors. In 
particular, when one erroneously performs task A instead of task B (for 
example a parity judgment instead of a magnitude judgment) the association 
between task A and the corresponding response is strengthened. Thus, on a 
subsequent trial there is an advantage of presenting task A (= switch trial) 
over task B (= repetition trial). On the other hand, after response errors, 
where the correct task is executed but the wrong response is given regular 
switch costs were found. 
In the study of Steinhauser and Hübner (2006) (Experiment 1) 
single digits were presented. Two tasks were executed in a random order: a 
parity task and a magnitude task. A cue indicated which of the two tasks had 
to be performed. To dissociate task and response errors, Steinhauser and 
Hübner (2006) looked at the difference between congruent and incongruent 
stimuli. In case of a congruent stimulus the same response button is used for 
both tasks whereas an incongruent stimulus requires a different response for 
each task. For example, if the responses ‘odd’ and ‘< 5’ are mapped onto 
one response button, 3 is a congruent stimulus and 2 an incongruent 
stimulus. The logic to dissociate task errors from response errors was as 
follows: if participants made an error on a congruent stimulus this was 
considered a response error, since a task error would elicit the same 
response as a correct answer. On the other hand an error on an incongruent 
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stimulus could signify both a task error and a response error. But according 
to Steinhauser and Hübner (2006) not much response errors will be made on 
these kinds of trials and so these errors were automatically considered task 
errors. As already mentioned, their results indicated switch benefits after 
errors on incongruent trials (= task errors) and typical switch costs, although 
not significant, after errors on congruent trials (= response errors).  
Although the approach developed by Steinhauser and Hübner 
(2006) provides a means to study response related effects on switch costs, 
there are some critical points that we would like to address with the current 
study. First of all, a task error on a congruent stimulus cannot be detected 
because it requires the same response button as the correct response. All 
task errors on congruent stimuli were thus classified as correct responses. 
Second, on incongruent stimuli response errors and task errors cannot be 
dissociated from each other, whereas Steinhauser and Hübner (2006) 
considered all errors on incongruent stimuli as task errors. All response 
errors on incongruent stimuli were thus classified as task errors. Third, the 
combination of performing the wrong task and the wrong response could not 
be dissociated from the other error types (for example, answering ‘even’ to 
the stimulus ‘3’ on a magnitude task). In the experiment of Steinhauser and 
Hübner (2006) this would be considered a task error if ‘3’ was an 
incongruent stimulus and a response error if ‘3’ was a congruent stimulus. 
Overall, the conclusion of Steinhauser and Hübner (2006), namely that task 
and response errors elicit different switch effects, might be too strong 
considering the difficulty by which the different error types can be 
univocally measured in their design.  
By using univalent stimulus-response mappings instead of bivalent 
stimulus-response mappings we were able to overcome the shortcomings 
outlined above. In our study every possible response was directed to one 
response button. This resulted in four response buttons that were divided 
over both hands. One hand was allocated to one task. Further, the two 
possible responses to a task (for example, odd and even in the Steinhauser 
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and Hübner (2006) study) were assigned to two fingers of the corresponding 
hand, which resembles the method used in Meiran and Daichman (2005). 
Consequently, on a certain trial each of the four response buttons 
corresponded unequivocally with one sort of response (a correct response, a 
response error, a task error or a combination of a task and a response error). 
Thus, in contrast to Steinhauser and Hübner’s (2006) design we were able to 
measure the exact number of task and response errors.  
In addition, we introduced two additional factors to increase the 
number of task and response errors. First, during the trial itself an extra 
transition cue (which indicated a repetition or a switch in respect to the task 
under execution) could be presented. The timing of this transition cue was 
manipulated such that we could control the number of task errors made. In 
our design a task error can thus be defined as not being able to change to the 
correct task in time. Second, to increase the response error rate we presented 
flanker stimuli on both sides of the target stimulus. More response errors 
were expected on incongruent flanker trials compared to congruent flanker 
trials. 
The investigation of task errors is not only useful to study response 
related modifications of switch effects. It also bridges the gap between 
research on error processing and research on task switching. More precisely, 
task error research could lead to a gain of insight in the combination of these 
two domains by for example investigating neural dissociations between 
different error types (Desmet, Fias, Hartstra, & Brass, 2011) or dissociations 
between post-error adjustments (Steinhauser & Hübner, 2008). However, 
behavioural studies on task errors that were reported so far all use the 
approach described above to disentangle task errors from other error types. 
Considering the timely issue of this topic, our study provides further 
information about the methods that can be used to study the relation 
between cognitive control and task related processes. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Participants. Eighteen subjects with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision participated in this study. All participants were students at the 
University of Ghent and received 10 euros for participation. 
Material. Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch computer screen. The 
viewing distance was about 50 cm. The response times were registered by a 
Pentium 4s PC. 
Stimuli and tasks. The experiment was conducted using Tscope 
software (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). 
Stimuli were presented on a black background. The target stimulus was 
centered on the middle of the screen (total outline: 1.3 cm x 0.4 cm) and 
always consisted of three letters. These letters were combinations of the 
letters L and R (outline: 0.7 x 0.4 cm) and could be printed in green or in 
yellow with this restriction that the two outside letters were always 
identical. The word ‘kleur’ (colour) or ‘letter’ (letter) preceded target 
presentation and served as a primary cue. A secondary task cue could appear 
after target presentation and consisted of a horizontal or a vertical ellipse 
centered on the target. The cues and the ellipses (outline: 1.5 cm x 3 cm for 
the vertical ellipses and 3 cm x 1.5 cm for the horizontal ellipses) were both 
presented in white.  
Participants had to perform one of two tasks in each trial; a letter or 
a colour task. The letter cue and the colour cue indicated the letter task and 
the colour task respectively. The presentation of both cues was randomized 
over all trials. During the letter task participants had to decide if the middle 
letter of the target was an L or and R. In the colour task the middle letter of 
the target had to be classified as green or yellow. On one third of the trials 
subjects had to make a task switch after target presentation in respect to the 
primary cue. This switch was indicated by a vertical ellipse appearing 
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around the target. For example: if the letter cue is presented and the middle 
letter of the target is a green R surrounded by a vertical ellipse, then the 
correct answer would be green instead of R. To control for the appearance 
of the ellipse also horizontal ellipses were presented. If a horizontal ellipse 
was presented, participants were instructed to do the task as was indicated 
by the primary cue. Further, to reduce waiting strategies in one third of all 
trials no ellipses were presented (no ellipse trials). To induce task errors and 
to control their number we adjusted the timing of the appearance of the 
ellipse following a staircase procedure. If participants made a correct 
response when a vertical ellipse was presented (within switch trial), the 
timing of the ellipse was delayed by 20 ms on the next trial. If participants 
made a task error on a trial with a vertical ellipse, the ellipse on the 
subsequent trial was presented 20 ms earlier. On the first trial the ellipse 
appeared 250 ms after the presentation of the target. The earliest point at 
which the ellipse could appear was 5 ms after target presentation. Note, that 
this procedure resembles that of the stop change paradigm. By varying the 
timing of the change signal delay (timing between the target presentation 
and the change signal) the chance of correctly performing the second task 
can be manipulated (for an overview see Verbruggen, Schneider, & Logan, 
2008). After a response error, a combination error or a too slow response, 
the timing of the ellipses was not adjusted. The outside letters of the target 
served as flanker stimuli. In half of the trials these flankers yielded the same 
response as the middle letter (congruent flanker condition). In the other half 
of the trials the flankers yielded a different response than the middle letter 
(incongruent flanker condition). Congruence or incongruence of the flankers 
always regarded the task specified by the last cue. For example: under the 
execution of the colour task two outside green letters and one middle yellow 
letter represent an incongruent flanker situation, independent from the 
identity of the letters presented (L or R). The 16 possible combinations of 
flanker and target occurred equally often. See Figure 1 for an example of a 
trial sequence. 
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Figure 1. Example of a trial sequence in Experiment 1. 
 
Responses were given by the index and the middle finger of the left 
and the right hand. One task always corresponded to one hand. Further the 
letter L always corresponded to the left finger and the letter R always 
corresponded to the right finger. The mapping of the hands to the tasks and 
of the colours to the fingers was counterbalanced across participants. By 
using these univalent stimulus-response mappings we could disentangle 
three different types of errors: response errors, task errors and combination 
errors. A response error corresponds to a response with the correct hand but 
with the wrong finger of that hand. This means that the correct task is 
performed but that the wrong response is given. For example, if the colour 
task has to be executed and a green letter is presented, a response error 
42     CHAPTER 2 
would be ‘yellow’. Second, a task error corresponds to a response with the 
wrong hand but with the correct finger of that hand. This means that you are 
in the wrong task but nevertheless give the correct response in that task. For 
example, if the letter task has to be executed and a green R is presented, a 
task error equals ‘green’. A third type of errors that we defined were 
combination errors. This corresponds to a response with the wrong hand and 
with the wrong finger. For example if a green R is presented during the 
letter task, a combination error would correspond to the response ‘yellow’. 
Design and procedure. The independent variables were within trial 
transition (no ellipse = no ellipse trial, horizontal ellipse = within repetition 
trial, vertical ellipse = within switch trial), flanker (congruent or incongruent 
trial) and between trial transition (between repetition or between switch 
trial). This last variable indicated whether on two subsequent trials the same 
task (between repetition trial) or a different task (between switch trial) had 
to be executed. Considering these three variables, we obtained 12 different 
cells.  Every cell was repeated 48 times during the experiment. In total 
participants received 576 experimental trials. 
The experiment started with a practice phase of 24 trials in which 
the ellipse did not appear. This was done to practice the stimulus-response 
mappings. After this practice phase a short break was presented. In a second 
practice phase of 72 trials the ellipses were introduced. During these 
practice phases the response deadline was 3000 ms. In the last 48 trials of 
the second practice phase the response deadline was determined for each 
participant individually. This was done by taking the mean response time on 
incongruent flanker trials. 
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 400 
ms. After the presentation of a blank screen of 400 ms the primary cue 
appeared for 300 ms. A blank screen followed for 400 ms, then the target 
was presented until subjects responded or until the response deadline had 
passed. Between the appearance of the target and the response deadline the 
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ellipse appeared (except for the no ellipse trials). This ellipse stayed on the 
screen together with the target until a response was given. After the 
disappearance of the target, feedback was provided for erroneous trials and 
for too slow responses. The words ‘FOUT’ (wrong) or ‘TE TRAAG’ (too 
slow) stayed then on the screen for 400 ms. Further, the words ‘TE 
TRAAG’ (too slow) were accompanied by an acoustic stimulus. In the cases 
where no feedback was provided a blank screen was included for 400 ms. 
After 1000 ms the next trial was presented. The experiment lasted for one 
hour. In the middle of the experiment a short break was inserted.  
RESULTS 
Overall error rates. The mean error rate was 25%, consisting of 12% 
task errors, 10% response errors and 3% combination errors. Trials where 
participants responded before the appearance of the ellipse (0.44%), before 
the appearance of the target (0.01%), or after the response deadline (8%) 
were discarded from the analysis. This resulted in an exclusion of 8.5% of 
all trials.  
As expected the task error rate was higher on within switch trials 
compared to the other trial types, F(1,17) = 51.93, p < 0.001 (5% (SD = 
0.05) in no ellipse trials, 6% (SD = 0.05) in within repetition trials and 25% 
(SD = 0.09) in within switch trials). The number of response errors was 
similar over the three levels of the within trial transition variable, F(2,34) = 
1.64, p = 0.21 (10% (SD = 0.06) in no ellipse trials, 10% (SD = 0.06) in 
within repetition trials and 12% (SD = 0.07) in within switch trials).  
In contrast to what could have been expected the number of 
response errors was equal for congruent and incongruent flanker trials 
(F(1,17) = 0.37, p = 0.55). (Also the number of task errors was constant over 
congruent and incongruent flanker trials, F < 1.)  
To summarize, the number of task errors was effectively 
manipulated by the within trial transition variable, whereas the flanker 
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manipulation did not affect the number of response errors. However, there 
was an effect of the flanker manipulation on response times. That is, faster 
responding occurred on congruent flankers compared to incongruent 
flankers, F(1,17) = 10.77, p < 0.01. So, although the flankers did not affect 
response errors, they did affect participants’ performance. Nevertheless, we 
obtained a sufficient rate of response errors to examine the effect of 
response errors on subsequent trials. Probably the response errors resulted 
from the use of a response deadline and the general difficulty of the task.  
Effects of task and response errors on subsequent trials. Error 
rates as well as mean response times were analyzed by two-way ANOVAs 
with repeated measures on the variables TRIAL TYPE N-1 (correct trial, 
task error trial and response error trial) and BETWEEN TRIAL 
TRANSITION (between repetition trial and between switch trial). In 
addition to the exclusion criteria cited above, we also discarded trials 
subsequent to trials where participants responded before the appearance of 
the ellipse or before the appearance of the target. Furthermore, the first trial 
of the experiment and the first trial after the pause were excluded from the 
analysis. This resulted in a mean exclusion of 9% of all trials.  
Error rates. In accordance with the results of Steinhauser and 
Hübner (2006) the interaction between TRIAL TYPE N-1 and BETWEEN 
TRIAL TRANSITION was significant, F(2,34) = 5.63, p < 0.01 (see Figure 
2). There was a reliable switch cost after correct trials, F(1,17) = 31.99, p < 
0.001. After task errors we observed switch benefits, F(1,17) = 4.55, p < 
0.05, and after response errors there were small but non significant switch 
costs, F < 1. 
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Figure 2. Between trial transition effects following correct responses, task errors and response 
errors measured on errors and response times. 
 
Because of our manipulation the task error rates are large in within 
switch trials but small in no ellipse trials and in within repetition trials. As a 
result the above pattern could change according to the different types of the 
within trial transition variable. In the following analysis we tested whether 
the data pattern remained the same for the three different types of the within 
trial transition variable. We computed a three-way repeated measures 
ANOVA on the variables WITHIN TRIAL TRANSITION N-1 (no ellipse 
trial, within repetition trial and within switch trial) TRIAL TYPE N-1 
(correct trial, task error trial and response error trial) and BETWEEN 
TRIAL TRANSITION (between repetition trial and between switch trial). 
The three-way interaction was marginally significant, F(4,68) = 2.37, p = 
0.06. Planned comparisons showed that for every level of the within trial 
transition variable there were reliable switch costs after correct responses 
(for no ellipse trials: F (1,17) = 15.44, p < 0.01; for within repetition trials: 
F (1,17) = 18.91, p < 0.01 and for within switch trials: F (1,17) = 18.26, p < 
0.01). Further the switch benefits after task errors were significant for no 
ellipse trials and within repetition trials but not for within switch trials (for 
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no ellipse trials: F(1,17) = 12.25, p < 0.01; for within repetition trials: F 
(1,17) = 10.22, p = 0.01 and for within switch trials: F <1). Finally, the 
switch costs after response errors did not reach significance in any of the 
three levels of the within trial transition variable (for no ellipse trials: F < 1; 
for within repetition trials: F < 1 and for within switch trials: F < 1). See 
Figure 3. The two-way interaction between TRIAL TYPE N-1 and 
BETWEEN TRIAL TRANSITION was significant for no ellipse trials 
(F(2,34) = 11.15, p < 0.001) and within repetition trials (F(2,34) = 7.69, p < 
0.01) but not for within switch trials (F(2,34) = 1.71, p = 0.20).  
Some task errors were the result of very fast responding. As a result, 
these errors could be perceived differently by the subjects and therefore 
elicit different results. To investigate this matter, we divided the task errors 
according to the time between ellipse occurrence and response. A time 
interval of 250 ms or less was defined as fast. Using this cut-off resulted in a 
comparable amount of trials in fast and slow cells (F < 1). We performed a 
repeated measures ANOVA on the variables TASK ERROR N-1 (fast 
versus slow) and BETWEEN TRIAL TRANSITION (between repetition 
trial and between switch trial). The variables did not interact, F < 1, 
indicating that the absence of switch benefits after task errors was not due to 
the timing of the ellipse on the previous trial. Main effects of BETWEEN 
TRIAL TRANSITION (F < 1) and TASK ERROR N-1 (F(1,17) = 1.35, p = 
0.26) were not significant. 
Response times. The mean response time was 1026 ms (measured 
from target presentation). Although we obtained a significant interaction 
between TRIAL TYPE N-1 and BETWEEN TRIAL TRANSITION on trial 
N, F (2,34) = 4.29, p < 0.05, the switch benefits after task errors were not 
significant, F (1,17) = 2.02, p = 0.17. Significant switch costs emerged after 
a correct response, F(1,17) = 41.36, p < 0.001. Finally, there were no 
significant switch costs after response errors, F < 1. See Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. Between trial transition effects following correct responses, task errors and response 
errors on no ellipse trials, within repetition trials and within switch trials measured on error 
rates. 
 
DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 1 
The aim of the present study was to replicate the dissociation 
between task and response errors with an adjusted design that unequivocally 
allows dissociating task errors from response errors. Instead of using 
bivalent stimulus-response mappings we used univalent stimulus-response 
mappings. In this way we could disentangle the different types of errors 
(namely; task errors, response errors and a combination of both errors) in a 
more straightforward manner. Second, we used a procedure to increase the 
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rate of task and response errors. The number of task errors was effectively 
manipulated by the within trial transition variable. Although we failed to 
induce response errors by our flanker manipulation, we found a sufficient 
response error rate. In general, we replicated the results of Steinhauser and 
Hübner (2006). That is, we found an interaction between TRIAL TYPE N-1 
(correct response, response error and task error) and BETWEEN TRIAL 
TRANSITION (between repetition trial and between switch trial) on error 
rates. More specifically, after the execution of a task error switch benefits 
instead of switch costs emerged on the subsequent trial. Although the 
pattern for response times mirrors that of the error rates we did not obtain 
significant switch benefits after task errors. In the study of Steinhauser and 
Hübner (2006) no significant effects were found for response times either. 
Originally, the authors attributed this finding to the use of a response 
deadline that might have obscured the data. However in a further paper, 
where they did not use response deadlines, they did not obtain significant 
interactions (only marginal) for response times either (Steinhauser & 
Hübner, 2008). Nevertheless, as in our study, the direction of the response 
time pattern resembled that of the error rate pattern, so there was no sign of 
a speed-accuracy trade off.  
An additional important difference between our study and the study 
of Steinhauser and Hübner (2006) is that we used feedback whereas they did 
not. In spite of the feedback we still observed switch benefits after the 
execution of task errors. This is highly in line with the RBS account 
proposed by Steinhauser and Hübner (2006). According to this account it is 
not the activation of the task at the end of the trial but the task activation at 
the moment of an overt response that will influence the next trial. They 
supported this hypothesis by showing that switch benefits after task errors 
still emerged when participants had to indicate whether they made an error 
or not. Similarly, in our experiment the feedback, or the knowledge that one 
executed the wrong task (given that participants knew to what error type the 
feedback referred), did not overrule the effects emerging from the error 
execution itself. To summarize, overall we replicated the findings of 
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Steinhauser and Hübner (2006) and seemingly found further support for the 
RBS account.  
Surprisingly, the two-way interaction between TRIAL TYPE N-1 
and BETWEEN TRIAL TRANSITION on error rates was not significant 
after within switch trials. In other words, the switch benefits disappeared 
after trials where task errors were elicited, and thus where most task errors 
were made. We could thus say that the observations of Steinhauser and 
Hübner (2006) did not emerge on trials where two tasks were cued (one by 
the primary cue and one by the ellipse). This indicates that the task that was 
not executed (indicated by the primary cue) also influenced switch costs. 
Moreover, it seems that both task indications (primary and secondary cue) 
lead to switch effects, respectively switch benefits and switch costs, and as 
such cancel out switch effects on the next trial. This would suggest that not 
only the task that was related to the executed response leads to switch 
effects but that also the task that was not executed has an influence on 
switch effects. In task switching literature, the role of response execution on 
subsequent switch costs has been stressed (Philipp, Jolicoeur, Falkenstein, 
& Koch, 2007; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2006). Also the RBS account considers response execution 
a necessary condition to obtain subsequent switch effects. However, the fact 
that pre-execution influences switch costs does not necessarily contradict 
the RBS account. More precisely, according to the RBS theory, task 
strengthening occurs at the moment of response execution proportional to 
the task activation of the executed task. Strong task activation will lead to 
strong strengthening of this particular task and vice versa. Probably, task 
activation will be less strong when two tasks are presented, compared to 
situations where only one task occurs. Consequently, the absence of switch 
effects in double task trials could be explained by minor task strengthening 
due to smaller task activation.  
To further investigate the influence of pre-execution on switch 
effects, we conducted an additional experiment in which we compared 
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switch effects after trials in which two tasks were indicated compared to 
trials in which only one task was indicated. Instead of offering the secondary 
task indication at a variable delay after target presentation we decided to 
offer the secondary task indication at a fixed short (60 ms) or long delay 
(700 ms) before presentation of the stimulus. In this way, the variability 
caused by the variable delay of the transition variable is reduced. A similar 
approach was taken in an fMRI study of Brass and von Cramon (2004) 
investigating the role of task preparation. To unravel effects of cue 
processing and task preparation they applied a double cue to task mapping. 
In other words, two cues were allocated to one task and two other cues were 
allocated to the other task. Before the presentation of the stimulus two cues 
were consecutively presented. In this way three different trial types 
emerged; the same cue appeared twice (switch none), two different cues 
appeared but they indicated the same task (switch cue) and two different 
cues, indicating different tasks appeared (switch task). Interestingly, the 
difference between switch task and switch cue trials, signifies a switch to 
the other task while controlling for cue related processes. If we find a 
reduction in between-trial switch costs after switch task trials compared to 
switch cue trials, this would confirm our hypothesis and signify that pre-
execution processes already influence switch effects on the next trial. Since 
we replicate the method used in Brass and von Cramon (2004), we decided 
to use their tasks (parity and magnitude) and stimuli (numbers) instead of 
the letter and colour task of Experiment 1.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
METHOD 
Participants. Nineteen subjects with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision participated in this experiment. All participants were students at the 
University of Ghent and received 10 euros in exchange for participation. 
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Apparatus. Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch computer screen. 
The viewing distance was about 50 cm. The response times were registered 
by a Pentium 4s PC. 
Stimuli and tasks. The experiment was conducted using Tscope 
software (Stevens et al., 2006). Stimuli were presented in white on a black 
background. The target stimulus was centered on the middle of the screen 
and was a number ranging from 20 to 40 (except for the number 30). 
According to the experimental condition one or two cues were offered 
before target presentation. Cues consisted of four different figures; diamond, 
square, triangle and inverted triangle.  
Participants had to perform two number tasks; a parity (Is the target 
stimulus odd or even?) and a magnitude task (Is the target stimulus larger or 
smaller than 30?). The diamond and the triangle indicated the magnitude 
task. The square and the inverted triangle indicated the parity task.  
Four experimental conditions were defined. In two fifths of the trials 
only one cue was shown before target presentation (one cue condition). In 
the switch none condition two identical cues were presented before target 
presentation. In the switch cue condition two different cues indicating the 
same task were offered (for example a diamond and a triangle). Finally, in 
the switch task condition two different cues indicating different tasks were 
presented (for example a diamond and a square). Switch none, switch cue 
and switch task trials were equally divided over three fifths of the trials. The 
task of the participant was to categorize the target number according to the 
last offered task cue. The transition of tasks between trials was also 
balanced. In other words, over the whole experiment the amount of between 
task repetitions and between task switches was the same (between task 
transitions are defined as the transition between the tasks that have to be 
executed). In half of the trials a short cue target interval was presented (60 
ms), in the other half of the trials a long interval was presented (700 ms). In 
total participants received 1200 experimental trials. 
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Responses were given by the index fingers of the left and the right 
hand. The responses belonging to one task were divided over the two 
buttons. The four different stimulus-response mappings were balanced 
across participants.  
Procedure. The experiment started with a practice phase of 60 trials. 
The first 20 trials were one cue trials. The subsequent 20 trials included all 
experimental conditions. However, participants received 7000 ms to fulfill a 
trial. Finally, the last 20 practice trials were identical to the experimental 
trials.  
 
Figure 4. Example of a switch task (above) and a one cue trial (below) in Experiment 2. 
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Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 200 
ms. Then a cue appeared for 100 ms. After the presentation of a blank 
screen of 700 ms the second cue (except for one cue trials) appeared for 100 
ms. After 60 ms (short CTI) or 700 ms (long CTI) the target was presented 
for 400 ms. From the presentation of the target onwards participants 
received 2000 ms to respond. After erroneous responses the word 
‘FOUT’(wrong) was presented on the screen for 200 ms. After a too slow 
response the words ‘TE TRAAG’ (too slow) appeared. In the cases where 
no feedback was provided a blank screen was included for 200 ms. After an 
interval of 1000 ms the next trial started. The experiment lasted for one 
hour. Two small breaks were inserted. See Figure 4 for an overview of the 
trial sequence. 
RESULTS 
The mean response time was 932 ms (SD = 163) and the mean error 
rate was 16% (SD = 7%).  
Response times. Switch costs were analyzed by a repeated 
measures ANOVA on the variable CONDITION N-1
2
 (one cue, switch 
none, switch cue and switch task). Too slow responses, the first 
experimental trial, every first trial after a break and the first trial following 
these conditions were discarded. On the current trial only correct one cue 
trials were included. Also, on trial N-1 only correct trials were included. In 
this way 26% of all trials were effectively used in the analysis. The main 
effect of CONDITION N-1 was significant, indicating that switch costs 
altered after different trial types, F(3,54) = 3.56, p < 0.05. We further 
                                                     
2Note that we also manipulated the interval between the last cue and the stimulus 
(CTI). Since this variable did not influence further switch costs, we did not include 
the variable in the reported ANOVA. However, the results concerning the CTI 
manipulation are presented in Appendix A. 
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investigated this finding by comparing switch costs after the two crucial 
conditions namely, switch cue trials and switch task trials. The switch cost 
was larger after switch cue trials than after switch task trials, F(1,18) = 8.43, 
p < 0.01. See Figure 5. 
Error rates. Analogous to the analysis on response times we 
compared switch costs after the different trial types by conducting a 
repeated measure ANOVA on the variable CONDITION N-1. However, it 
seems that switch costs measured on error rates do not differ after the 
different conditions as the effect of CONDITION N-1 did not reach 
significance, F(3,54) = 1.42, p = 0.25. On error rates we did thus not 
replicate the effect of preparation on the switch cost. See Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Between trial transition effects following one cue, switch none, switch cue and 
switch task trials on response times and error rates. 
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DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 2 
In line with our prediction we found that when on the previous trial 
two tasks are prepared switch costs are reduced. In other words, tasks that 
are not overtly executed can influence further switch effects. However, as 
outlined in the discussion of Experiment 1, our data do not deny the 
triggering role of response execution. In other words, response execution 
might be needed to exert the influence of task preparation.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
By using a paradigm that allows to unequivocally disentangle task 
errors from response errors, we largely replicated the findings of 
Steinhauser and Hübner (2006) of switch benefits after task errors. This 
finding provides further evidence for the RBS account. Even with univalent 
stimulus-response mappings switch benefits were found after task errors. 
However this effect was restricted to trials where only one task is indicated. 
In trials where two tasks were indicated no switch effects emerged after task 
errors. This led us to formulate the hypothesis that a task that is not executed 
might also influence switch costs on the next trial. To study this issue in 
more detail we performed a second experiment. We compared switch costs 
after double cue trials. According to our hypothesis, we found that switch 
costs were reduced after trials in which two different tasks were cued 
compared to trials where only one task was cued. We thus argue that pre-
execution processes, and in particular task preparation, can influence 
performance on subsequent trials. In a way our data thus extend the RBS 
account, by demonstrating the influence of task preparation on task 
activation. In other words, we investigate the conditions that lead to task 
activation and as such influence the strengthening of a task.  
Pre-execution processes should thus not be neglected in task 
switching research. Moreover, we believe that the double cue method used 
in our experiments can shed more light on the particular role that is 
attributed to response execution. For example, in the RBS account it is 
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stated that response execution is needed for task strengthening. Also, 
research using go-nogo methods have labeled response execution a 
necessary condition for subsequent switch costs (Philipp et al., 2007; 
Schuch & Koch, 2003). However, using a double cue method leads to some 
observations that need further attention regarding this issue. First, one can 
consider the double cue trials from Experiment 2 as a mixture of two trial 
types. More precisely, double cue trials can be seen as a sequence of a trial 
consisting of one cue and a trial consisting of a cue and a target (trial 1: cue, 
trial 2: cue-target). We observed worse performance on switch task trials 
(e.g., trial 1: parity, trial 2: magnitude-target) compared to switch cue trials 
(e.g., trial 1: parity, trial 2: parity-target) (F(1,18) = 7.25, p < 0.05). If we 
consider the first cue as a separate trial we might say that we have an 
indication that switch effects emerge after trials on which no response was 
given and thus where no strengthening could have taken place (i.e., trials 
where only a cue appeared). However, since the time between consecutive 
cues was relatively small, subjects probably did not perceive the first cue as 
a separate trial. Interestingly, in another experiment of Brass and von 
Cramon (2002), effects of trials in which only a cue appeared (cue only) 
were studied in more detail. There, cue only presentations were considered 
as separate trials. That is, a fixation cross separated these trials from the 
next and from previous trials. Further, the cue only trial lasted for 2000 ms. 
Although this study was an fMRI experiment and was only ran on 13 
subjects, we reanalyzed the behavioural data in light of the current 
hypothesis. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found (marginal) switch 
costs after cue only trials. On short CTI conditions we obtained a switch 
cost of 41 ms after a cue only trial, (F(1,12) = 4.40, p = 0.06). On long CTI 
conditions the switch cost after cue only trials was not significant (-3 ms, F 
< 1). This observation was also recently found in a study of Lenartowicz, 
Yeung and Cohen (2011). These authors showed that while no-go trials lead 
to a reduction of switch costs, trials in which only a cue was presented did 
evoke switch costs.  
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A second argument is provided by neuroimaging data. In the studies 
of Brass and von Cramon (2002) and Brass and von Cramon (2004) it is 
shown that preparation without execution (as measured in cue only trials 
and switch task trials) already evoke general preparation related brain 
regions. In particular, these regions mirror those found for switch versus 
repeat trials in regular single cue trials. In other words, the cognitive control 
network is already involved during task preparation, irrespective of task 
execution. If preparation only has an indirect influence via the increase or 
decrease of task specific activation one would expect only task specific 
activation during mere task preparation.  
CONCLUSION 
In sum, in Experiment 1 we replicated the original findings of 
Steinhauser and Hübner (2006). More precisely, with an adjusted design that 
remedies some of the shortcomings of the procedure used by Steinhauser 
and Hübner (2006) we could replicate the dissociation between response and 
task errors. In addition, we found that pre-execution processes, and in 
particular task preparation, might play an important role on the switch cost. 
Future research should thus further elaborate on the role of different stages 
of task processing.  
Finally, as already mentioned in the introduction we would like to 
stress the importance of research on different error types. Although in this 
study, different error types were only used as a method to investigate switch 
effects, our results indicate that task errors can be dissociated from response 
errors. More specific, a task error leads to a benefit while a response error 
leads to a cost. This implies that task errors lead to an improvement of the 
wrong behaviour. Steinhauser and Hübner (2008) already addressed this 
question and showed that an additional slow-acting mechanism (error 
induced inhibition) overcomes the negative consequences from task error 
learning in slow trials. In this way subsequent behaviour can be optimized 
and learning from task errors is not impossible.  
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APPENDIX A 
RESPONSE TIMES 
A repeated measures ANOVA on the variables CTI N-1 (short CTI 
and long CTI) and TYPE N-1 (one cue, switch none, switch cue and switch 
task) revealed a non significant main effect of CTI N-1, F < 1. As expected 
from the analysis reported in the manuscript, the main effect of TYPE N-1 
was significant, F(3,54) = 3,85, p < 0.05, with reduced switch costs on 
switch task trials compared to switch cue trials, F(1,18) = 9.58, p < 0.01. 
The interaction between CTI N-1 and CONDITION N-1 did not reach 
significance, F < 1. In particular, paired comparisons showed that the CTI 
N-1 variable did not alter the switch costs after switch task trials, F < 1 or 
the difference in switch costs between switch cue and switch task trials, F < 
1. 
ERROR RATES 
Switch costs were again analyzed by means of a repeated measures 
ANOVA on the variables CTI N-1 (short CTI and long CTI) and TYPE N-1 
(one cue, switch none, switch cue and switch task). None of the main effects 
(CTI N-1: F(1,18) = 1.33, p = 0.26, TYPE N-1: F(3,54) = 1.47, p = 0.24) nor 
the interaction(F < 1) reached significance. Further, the switch effects after 
switch task trials (F(1,18) = 1.52, p = 0.23), or the difference in switch costs 
between switch cue and switch task trials were not changed by the CTI N-1 
variable, F < 1. 
 
 
 CHAPTER 3 
ERRORS AND CONFLICT AT THE TASK LEVEL AND THE 
RESPONSE LEVEL1 
In the last decade research on error and conflict processing has 
become one of the most influential research areas in the domain of cognitive 
control. There is now converging evidence that a specific part of the 
posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC), the rostral cingulate zone 
(RCZ), is crucially involved in the processing of errors and conflict. 
However, error related research has primarily focused on a specific error 
type, namely response errors. The aim of the present study was to 
investigate whether errors on the task level rely on the same neural and 
functional mechanisms. Here we report a dissociation of both error types in 
the pMPFC: whereas response errors activate the RCZ, task errors activate 
the dorsal frontomedian cortex. Although this last region shows an overlap 
in activation for task and response errors on the group level, a closer 
inspection of the single subject data is more in accordance with a functional 
anatomical dissociation. When investigating brain areas related to conflict 
on the task and response level, a clear dissociation was perceived between 
areas associated with response conflict and with task conflict. Overall, our 
data support a dissociation between response and task levels of processing 
in the pMPFC. In addition, we provide further evidence for a dissociation 
between conflict and errors both at the response level and at the task level.   
                                                     
1
Desmet, C., Fias, W., Hartstra, E., & Brass, M. (2011). Errors and conflict at the 
task and the response level. Journal of Neuroscience, 31(4), 1366-1374. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a long lasting debate regarding the functional organization 
of the posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC) in adaptive control 
(Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Ullsperger & von 
Cramon, 2004). The term pMPFC refers to the part of the medial frontal 
cortex that extends from the presupplementary motor area (preSMA) 
anteriorly and dorsally from the anterior cingulate sulcus including parts of 
the anterior cingulate cortex (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von 
Cramon, 2004). Several studies have reported a dorsal-ventral distinction in 
this region with more ventral parts being involved in error processing and 
more dorsal parts involved in conflict resolution (Braver, Barch, Gray, 
Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Kiehl, Liddle, & Hopfinger, 2000; Ullsperger & 
von Cramon, 2001; Wittfoth, Kustermann, Fahle, & Herrmann,  2008). From 
a neuro-anatomical perspective such a dissociation seems plausible because 
ventral parts of the pMPFC are more related to the primary motor cortex and 
the spinal cord whereas dorsal parts are connected to brain areas related to 
high-level motor cognition (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001; Ullsperger & 
von Cramon, 2004). Since response errors require a response change it is 
reasonable to assume that they rely on motor-related brain areas while 
response conflict cannot be resolved by giving another response and 
therefore should rely on brain areas involved in higher level adaptive 
processes. So far, however, error and conflict research has focused primarily 
on the response level while greatly ignoring the more abstract task level. 
Interestingly, recent conflict research suggests that increasing the level of 
abstractness leads to a shift of conflict related brain activity in the anterior 
direction. In particular, it seems that posterior parts of the pMPFC are 
related to response conflict while anterior parts are related to other forms of 
conflict such as conflict between decisions and strategies (Kouneiher, 
Charron, &  Koechlin, 2009; Pochon, Riis, Sanfey, Nystrom, & Cohen, 
2008; Venkatraman, Rosati, Taren, & Huettel, 2009).  
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The aim of the current study is to manipulate the level of 
abstractness both for errors and conflict by investigating errors and conflict 
on the task and the response level. Task related control processes have been 
investigated with the so called task switching paradigm (Monsell, 2003). 
Here participants have to alternate between different task representations. 
However, most task switching research has exclusively focused on accurate 
performance. Only few studies have addressed erroneous performance or 
task errors (Steinhauser & Hübner, 2006; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2008; 
Steinhauser, 2010). By studying both errors and conflict at the response and 
task level our design permits us to combine the dimension of abstractness 
(response level and task level) with the dimension of control (conflict and 
errors). This raises the interesting possibility to compare task related 
processing with response related processing for errors (task errors versus 
response errors) and conflict (task conflict versus response conflict). In 
addition, the design enables us to compare error with conflict related 
processing within each level of abstractness (response errors versus 
response conflict / task errors versus task conflict). 
Based on the above mentioned literature, we expect to find 
dissociations between response conflict and response errors. Furthermore, 
we also expect a dissociation between response conflict and task conflict. 
However, as regards the activity for task errors and its relation to response 
errors, two alternative hypotheses can be formulated. On the one hand, one 
can argue that both response and task errors signal the need for adaptive 
processes. From this perspective both types of errors should activate similar 
brain regions. On the other hand, one can argue that the type of adaptive 
behaviour required after both errors is completely different. While response 
errors require an adaptation of the motor output, task errors require more 
abstract adaptive processes. From this perspective, one would predict task 
and response errors to rely on different brain areas.  
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METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
21 participants (16 females) participated in this study (mean age = 
22.8 years, SD = 2.5 years). All were right handed as was measured by the 
Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). 25 euro could be earned in exchange 
for participation. All participants gave written informed consent and had no 
history of neurological disorders. Ethical approval was given by the Medical 
Ethical Review Board of the Ghent University hospital. 
STIMULI AND TASKS 
The experiment was implemented using Tscope software (Stevens, 
Lammertyn,  Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). Stimuli were 
presented on a black background. The target stimulus was centered on the 
middle of the screen and consisted of a coloured letter. The letter could be 
printed in green or in yellow and was either an L or an R. The word ‘colour’ 
or the word ‘letter’ preceded target presentation and served as task cue for 
the colour task and the letter task respectively. The presentation of both cues 
was randomized over all trials. During the letter task participants had to 
decide if the letter on the screen was an L or and R. In the colour task the 
letter had to be classified as green or as yellow. In the task change condition 
a secondary task cue could appear after target presentation and consisted of 
a vertical ellipse centered on the target. The cues and the ellipse were both 
presented in white.  
Three types of trials were presented. First, to induce task errors a 
secondary task cue was presented after target presentation. This secondary 
task cue consisted of an ellipse and always indicated a task switch in respect 
to the primary task cue or the word cue. For example, a green R surrounded 
by an ellipse following the letter cue should be answered with green and not 
with R. Further, we adjusted the timing of the presentation of the ellipse to a 
staircase procedure. On the first ellipse trial ( = task change trial) the ellipse 
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appeared 250 ms after target presentation. If participants made a correct 
response, then the presentation of the ellipse on the next trial was delayed by 
20 ms. If, on the other hand, participants made a task error on a task change 
trial, the ellipse was presented 20 ms earlier on the next trial. In this way the 
chance of making a task error on a task change trial was about 50 percent. 
The earliest time point at which the ellipse could appear was 5 ms after 
target presentation. Second, to induce response errors we exchanged the 
appeared target with a different target after a certain delay. The second 
target differed from the first one according to the relevant stimulus 
dimension. For example, under execution of the colour task a green R would 
change into a yellow R. To perform the trial correctly participants had to 
respond to the stimulus that appeared the latest. As in the task change trials 
the timing of the target exchange was adjusted to a staircase algorithm. This 
means that after a correct response on a stimulus change trial, a target 
change on the next trial occurred 20 ms later. Whereas, after a response 
error on a stimulus change trial the target change on the next stimulus 
change trial appeared 20 ms earlier. Again, the earliest time point at which 
the change could occur was 5 ms after the first target presentation and the 
time interval between first and second presentation on the first trial was 250 
ms. Note that this method resembles that of the stop change paradigm. By 
varying the timing of the change signal delay (time between the target 
presentation and the change signal) the chance of correctly performing the 
second task can be manipulated (for an overview see Verbruggen, 
Schneider, & Logan, 2008). Third, to reduce waiting strategies we also 
offered catch trials. In these trials no ellipses or changes of target were 
presented. For an overview of the different trial types see Figure 1. 
Responses were given by the index and the middle finger of the left and the 
right hand by response button boxes that were placed on the right and left 
upper leg. Similar to Meiran and Daichman (2005), we used univalent 
stimulus-response mappings. This means that we mapped every possible 
response to one effector. More specifically, we allocated each task to a 
different hand and then allocated the index and the middle finger of both 
hands to a different response. Further, the L response always corresponded 
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to the left finger and the R response always corresponded to the right finger. 
The mapping of the hands to the tasks and of the colours to the fingers was 
balanced across participants. In this way every possible response, and 
likewise every possible error, was mapped onto a different effector. This 
allows inferring from the subject’s responses which type of error was made 
(Meiran & Daichman, 2005). A response error corresponds to a response 
with the correct hand but with the wrong finger of that hand. This means 
that the correct task is performed but that the wrong response is given. For 
example, the response yellow to a green letter under the execution of the 
colour task would correspond to a response error. A task error corresponds 
to a response with the wrong hand but with the correct finger of that hand. 
This equals a correct response to the wrong task. For example, the response 
green to a green R under the execution of the letter task is considered a task 
error. Note that a response with the wrong hand is not automatically 
classified as a task error. One could also respond with the wrong hand and 
with the wrong finger. This would represent a combination of a response 
and a task error. For example, the response yellow to a green R under the 
execution of the letter task would correspond to this combined error. 
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
In total there were 4 blocks. Every block consisted of 80 
experimental trials and 8 null events. The null events consisted of a blank 
screen presented for 4500 ms. The 80 experimental trials were divided over 
32 task change trials, 32 stimulus change trials and 16 catch trials. The 
presentation of trials was randomized so that the amount of task repetitions 
and task switches between trials was the same over all trials. 
Participants received a first training phase outside the scanner. This 
training phase was divided over four blocks. In the first three blocks 
respectively only catch trials, task change trials and stimulus change trials 
were offered. During the final block all trial types were then intermixed. The 
second training phase took place in the scanner while the anatomical scan 
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was taken. During this phase a mixture of all trial types was immediately 
presented.  
 
 
Figure 1. Sequence of the three different trial types. From top to bottom: catch trials, 
task change trials and stimulus change trials. Two different tasks have to be performed; 
classifying the colour of the letter as green or as yellow or classifying the letter as an R 
or an L. All trial types start with the presentation of a task cue. This task cue indicates 
the colour task (the word ‘colour’ appears) or the letter task (the word ‘letter’ appears). 
Four response buttons are used. They are allocated to the index and middle finger of 
the left and right hand. One task was allocated to one hand and the L response was 
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always allocated to the left finger of the corresponding hand. In catch trials the task 
indicated by the task cue has to be applied on the stimulus at the moment of stimulus 
presentation. In task change trials we tried to elicit task errors by presenting a task 
change signal after stimulus presentation. This task change signal indicates a task 
switch in respect to the primary cue. In the figure, the correct response for the task 
change trial is thus green and not R. The delay between the stimulus and the task 
change signal was adjusted to a staircase algorithm. As a result participants should 
make about 50% task errors in the task change trials. In stimulus change trials we tried 
to elicit response errors by presenting a stimulus change after the first stimulus 
presentation. Participants should try to respond to this changed stimulus and not to the 
first presented stimulus. In the figure the correct response for the stimulus change trial 
is thus L and not R. We also adjusted the delay between the primary and secondary 
stimulus to a staircase algorithm so that the percentage of response errors would be 
around 50%.   
 
Each trial started with a variable jitter interval of 0, 500, 1000 or 
1500 ms. Then a fixation cross was presented for 400 ms. After a blank 
screen presentation for 400 ms the cue appeared. After a cue stimulus 
interval of 700 ms the target appeared until participants responded or until 
the deadline of 3000 ms had passed. Between the presentation of the target 
and the response deadline an ellipse or a changed stimulus could appear. 
Likewise the target presentation, the ellipse and the changed stimulus stayed 
on the screen until participants responded or until 3000 ms had passed. 
During the practice phase feedback was provided after an erroneous answer 
(the word ‘FOUT’ (wrong) appeared on the screen for 400 ms), during the 
experiment itself no feedback was provided. Only after too slow responses 
the words ‘TE TRAAG’ (too slow) appeared on the screen for 400 ms. The 
sequence of the different trial types is shown in Figure 1. 
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FMRI METHODS 
The experiment was carried out on a 3T scanner (Siemens Trio) 
using an 8-channel radiofrequency head coil. Subjects were positioned head 
first and supine in the magnet bore. First, 176 high-resolution anatomical 
images were acquired using a T1-weighted three-dimensional MPRAGE 
sequence (TR = 2530 ms, TE = 2.58 ms, image matrix = 256 ×256, FOV = 
220 mm, flip angle = 7º, slice thickness = 0.90 mm, voxel size = 0.9 ×0.86 × 
0.86 mm (resized to 1×1×1 mm)). Whole brain functional images were 
collected using a T2*-weighted EPI sequence, sensitive to BOLD contrast 
(TR = 2000 ms, TE =35 ms, image matrix = 64 × 64, FOV = 224 mm, flip 
angle = 80º, slice thickness = 3.0 mm, distance factor = 17%, voxel size 3.5 
× 3.5 × 3 mm, 30 axial slices). A varying number of images were acquired 
per run because of the self-paced initiation of trials. All data were analyzed 
using SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5/). To account 
for T1 relaxation effects each EPI sequence started with two dummy scans. 
First, all functional images were spatially realigned using rigid body 
transformation. After the realignment they were slice-time corrected using 
the first slice as a reference. The structural image of each subject was co 
registered with their mean functional image. Further, all functional images 
were normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada) T1 template. The images were resampled into 3.5 mm
3
 voxels and 
spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half 
maximum). A high pass filter of 128 seconds was applied during fMRI data 
analysis. To correct for multiple comparisons we used the program 
AlphaSim (afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni/doc/manual/AlphaSim). This program 
determines the probability of a false positive detection from the frequency 
count of cluster sizes, using Monte Carlo simulations. The program 
determined that a cluster size of 22 contiguous voxels, considered that Z > 
3.1 (p < 0.001 uncorrected), corresponded to a corrected p < 0.05 level. 
Consequently, in the results section we only report activated clusters of 
minimum 22 voxels. Statistical analyses were performed using the general 
linear model implemented in SPM5. We distinguished task errors, response 
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errors and correct trials for the three experimental conditions (catch trials, 
task change trials and stimulus change trials), resulting in 9 regressors. 
Because we wanted to dissociate different error types, the moment of 
response execution (correct response or error) was used as a main event of 
interest in the general linear model. Both a canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF) and the first time derivative were modeled on the 
moment of response for each trial. Six regressors defining head movement 
were also included in the model to account for residual movement effects. 
We computed contrast images by comparing the parameter estimates for the 
regressors containing the canonical HRF. 
RESULTS 
BEHAVIOURAL RESULTS 
Two participants (2 females) were excluded from the analyses. 
Their mean error rates (66% and 64%) differed more than two SD’s from 
the overall mean.  
To investigate the effect of both staircase algorithms we compared 
the percentage of errors and correct trials in the different trial types. In task 
change trials we observed 42% correct trials (SD = 8), 47% task errors (SD 
= 8), 5% response errors (SD = 3) and 6% combination errors (SD = 4). In 
stimulus change trials there were 48% correct trials (SD = 2), 2% task error 
trials (SD = 2), 46% response errors (SD = 6) and 1% combination errors 
(SD = 1). In catch trials we observed 85% correct trials (SD = 9), 3% task 
error trials (SD = 4), 11% response errors (SD = 8) and 1% combination 
errors (SD = 2) (see Figure 2). Overall, the percentage of combination errors 
was very small (mean = 3%, SD = 3) and even in the task change trials the 
percentage only rose to 6%. This shows that participants did not just switch 
hands and guessed one out of the two responses during task change trials, 
otherwise the percentage of combination errors would have been higher.  
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Figure 2. Proportion of correct answers, task errors, response errors and combination errors 
on catch trials, task change trials and stimulus change trials. Bars represent standard errors 
across subjects. 
 
The mean reaction time over conditions and over participants was 
754 ms (SD = 155). We performed a repeated measures ANOVA analysis 
on the factors TRIAL TYPE (task change trials and stimulus change trials) 
by TYPE OF RESPONSE (correct, error) on reaction times. Note that the 
error corresponds to task errors in the task change trials and to response 
errors in the stimulus change trials. The analysis showed that correct 
answers (1229 ms) were performed slower than errors (576 ms) (F(1,18 = 
263.61, p < 0.001) and that task change trials (1014 ms) were performed 
slower than stimulus change trials (792 ms) (F(1,18) = 146.03, p < 0.001). 
These effects are logically explained by the fact that erroneous responses are 
a consequence of an insufficient processing of the secondary cue or 
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secondary stimulus and are thus faster than correct responses where the 
secondary cue or stimulus is more deeply processed. More interestingly the 
interaction between both factors also reached significance (F(1,18) = 79.49, 
p < 0.001). It seems that it is harder to perform a correct response under a 
task change trial (1432 ms) than a correct response under a stimulus change 
trial (1026 ms). In other words, overcoming task conflict seems to be more 
difficult than overcoming response conflict, see Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Interaction of trial type (task change trial, stimulus change trial) by type of response 
(correct, error) on mean response times in ms. Bars represent standard errors across subjects. 
 
In the previous analysis it is difficult to interpret reaction times 
because the staircase algorithm is applied on the investigated trials and 
therefore can interfere with the observed effects. In the following analyses 
we investigated if these effects remained on the subsequent trial. We 
performed a repeated measures ANOVA analysis on the factors PREVIOUS 
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TRIAL TYPE (trial n-1 task change trials and trial n-1 stimulus change 
trials) by PREVIOUS TYPE OF RESPONSE (trial n-1 correct, trial n-1 
error) on reaction times and error rates. Further, we only included correct 
catch trials on the current trial. Thus, in these analyses the staircase 
algorithm cannot interfere with the observed effects since there are no 
ellipses or changes of stimuli on catch trials. Participants were slower after 
correct trials (806 ms) than after erroneous trials (678 ms), F(1,18) = 11.87, 
p < 0.01. The phenomenon of post-error speeding has been reported before. 
Notebaert and colleagues (2009) showed that reaction times after an error 
are dependent on the proportion of errors in the experiment. In experiments 
where the frequency of occurrence of an error is high and therefore not 
surprising (as in our experiment) post-error speeding instead of post-error 
slowing is observed (Notebaert, Houtman, Van Opstal, Gevers, Fias, & 
Verguts, 2009). Furthermore, participants were slower after task change 
trials (797 ms) than after stimulus change trials (688 ms), F(1,18) = 10.81, p 
< 0.01. The two way interaction between PREVIOUS TRIAL TYPE (trial 
n-1 task change trials and trial n-1 stimulus change trials) and PREVIOUS 
TYPE OF RESPONSE (trial n-1 correct, trial n-1 error) was marginally 
significant, F(1,18) = 4.05, p = 0.06. The effects of the difficulty of 
overcoming task conflict (trial n-1correct task change trial: 895 ms) in 
comparison to response conflict (trial n-1 correct stimulus change trial: 716 
ms) seemed thus to persist in the next trial, see Figure 4. The same analysis 
on error rates revealed only a main effect of PREVIOUS TRIAL TYPE, 
F(1,18) = 10.57, p = 0.004, participants made more errors after a task 
change trial (21%) than after a stimulus change trial (14%). The main effect 
of PREVIOUS TYPE OF RESPONSE and the interaction between both 
factors did not reach significance (F’s < 1).  
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Figure 4. Interaction of previous trial type (trial n-1 task change trial, trial n-1stimulus change 
trial) by previous type of response (trial n-1correct, trial n-1error) on mean response times in 
ms on catch trials. Bars represent standard errors across subjects. 
 
FMRI RESULTS 
Error related activation. The first part of the analyses concentrated 
on whole brain contrasts revealing brain areas associated with response 
errors and brain areas associated with task errors. To this aim we selected 
task change trials to compute task error contrasts and stimulus change trials 
to compute response error contrasts. The logic underlying the composition 
of the contrasts was equal for both situation; we subtracted correct trials 
from error trials.  
The first contrast subtracted task change correct trials from task 
change task error trials and should thus show areas associated with task 
errors. Brain activity in the pMPFC was found. More precisely, the contrast 
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revealed activation in a region located more dorsal and anterior than the 
RCZ (as defined by Picard & Strick, 1996) which we will label as the dorsal 
frontomedian cortex (dFMC) (MNI coordinates, 6 39 54). Further, we found 
activation in the right inferior parietal lobe (rIPL, 57 -48 48).  
The second contrast aimed at revealing response error regions and 
subtracted stimulus change correct trials from stimulus change response 
error trials. Again, we found pMPFC activity. It seems that an area 
somewhat anterior to the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ, 6 51 30) was 
activated along with the dorsal frontomedian cortex (dFMC, 6, 27, 54). 
Further, we observed activity in the right middle temporal gyrus (rMTG, 57 
-66 3), and the right insula (rINS, 39, 21, -9) Brain activity related to task 
and response errors is shown in Figure 5 (see Table 1 for an overview of all 
related activations per contrast). 
 
Figure 5. Response error (blue) and task error (green) related activation superimposed on 
anatomical slices averaged across subjects. Response error activation is related to the contrast: 
stimulus change trials: response errors – correct trials. Task error activation is related to the 
contrast: task change trials: task errors – correct trials. (a) Activation for response and task 
errors in the pMPFC (MNI coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, blue: x, y, z = 6, 
51, 30 , Z = 3.87 and x, y, z = 6, 27, 54, Z = 4.13, green: x, y, z = 6, 39, 54, Z = 4.45). 
Overlapping activation is presented in red (MNI coordinates of maximal random effects Z 
scores, x, y, z = 3, 45, 39, Z = 3.43). (b) Activation in the MTG for response errors and in the 
IPL for task errors (MNI coordinates of maximal random effects Z scores, blue: x, y, z = 57, -
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66, 3, Z = 3.87, green: x, y, z = 57, -48, 48, Z = 4.56). (c) Activation in the INS for response 
errors (MNI coordinates of maximal random effects Z scores, x, y, z = 39, 21, -9, Z = 3.46). 
 
Table 1. MNI Coordinates of Whole Brain Contrasts  
 Peak coor-
dinates    
Z-score Extent 
Task error (task change trials: task error – correct) 
             Dorsal frontomedian cortex (dFMC)  6 39 54 4.45     99 
             Inferior parietal lobe (IPL) 57 -48 48 4.56     108 
Response error (stimulus change trials: response error – correct) 
             Dorsal frontomedian cortex (dFMC) 6 27 54 4.13 32 
             Rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) 6 51 30 3.87    44 
             Insula (INS) 39 21 -9 3.46 22 
             Middle temporal gyrus (MTG) 57 -66 3          3.87    39 
Conjunction task error and response error    
           Dorsal frontomedian cortex (dFMC) 3 45 39          3.43    28 
Response conflict (correct stimulus change trial- correct catch trial) 
            Inferior frontal junction (IFJ)  -45 18 27 3.52 69 
            Rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) -6 30 39 3.70 35 
            Middle frontal gyrus (MFG) 42 27 42 4.43 69 
            Frontomarginal sulcus (FMS)  -36 54 6 4.03 115 
Task conflict (correct task change trial – correct catch trial) 
           Presupplementar motor area (preSMA) -9 15 57 4.03 56 
           Middle frontal gyrus (MFG) 42 54 18 4.09 49 
           Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) -51 15 -3 4.02 22 
           Premotor cortex (PM)  -39 9 60 5.09 947 
           Inferior frontal junction (IFJ) -39 15 24 4.75  
           Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) -39 45 3 4.94  
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Conjunction task conflict and response conflict    
           Middle frontal gyrus (MFG) -36 51 27 4.46 173 
           Inferior frontal junction (IFJ)  -39 15 24 3.62 69 
 
To answer one of the main questions of the research, namely do task 
and response errors activate different or overlapping regions, we performed 
a conjunction analysis on the two above contrasts. This analysis shows 
activated voxels in the response error AND in the task error contrast at a 
group level. As expected from the results described above, we observed a 
significant overlap in the pMPFC (3 45 39) after applying the conjunction 
analysis. In addition, we examined if there were activations in the pMPFC 
uniquely related to one type of error. Therefore we masked both error 
contrasts with each other at a threshold of p < 0.001. For example, to 
investigate unique activation for task errors we took the task error contrast 
(task change task error – task change correct) and masked it with the 
response error contrast (stimulus change response error – stimulus change 
correct). The results showed that there was unique brain activity related to 
task errors in the dorsal part of the pMPFC (6, 36, 60) whereas unique brain 
activation related to response errors was located more ventral and more 
anterior in the pMPFC (3, 48, 33), (cluster size = 19 voxels). 
From the above analyses it seems that there is an overlap in the 
pMPFC between both error activations but that there is also unique 
activation belonging to response errors and unique activation belonging to 
task errors. In a final analysis we investigated if the overlap between both 
error activations could be identified for each participant individually. It 
could well be that the observed overlap is an artifact of the conjunction 
analysis. More precisely, in the conjunction analysis the overlap in 
activation is defined as the overlap between the group contrast for response 
errors and the group contrast for task errors. Therefore, individual variation 
is no longer taken into account. It is thus possible that none of the subjects 
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show an overlap in task and response errors while at a group level this 
overlap is significant. Considering that the cingulate sulcus shows a lot of 
anatomical variability between subjects (Paus et al., 1996; Pujol et al., 2002; 
Yücel et al., 2001) this hypothesis seems plausible. In order to investigate 
overlapping and unique brain activation at an individual level we first 
defined a region of interest in the pMPFC. This region was defined as 
follows: we took the three peak voxels of the task and response error 
activation in the pMPFC (MNI coordinates response errors: 6, 51, 30; 6, 27, 
54; task errors: 6, 39, 54) and drew a sphere of 20 mm around each of these 
coordinates. The range of the region stretched for the x-axis from -14 to 26, 
for the y-axis from 7 to 71 and for the z-axis from 10 to 74. Next, for each 
participant a conjunction and two masking analyses were performed in this 
region of interest. The conjunction and masking analyses were equal to the 
ones described in the group results, namely a conjunction between the task 
error and the response error contrast, a masking of the response error 
contrast with the task error contrast and a masking of the task error contrast 
with the response error contrast. The threshold was set low (p = 0.05 
uncorrected) in order to observe activation for every subject and no 
smoothing was applied. To be able to compare the activations across 
participants, we will express the number of activated voxels in percentages 
for each participant. The percentage of activation for task errors was 
calculated by dividing the number of voxels that were uniquely activated by 
task errors by the total amount of error activation in the mask. The 
percentage of activation for response errors was calculated by dividing the 
number of uniquely activated voxels for response errors by the total amount 
of error activation in the mask. Finally, the percentage of overlapping 
activation was calculated by dividing the number of voxels activated in the 
conjunction analysis by the total amount of error activation in the mask. 
Overall, the mean percentage of unique task error activation was larger 
(55%) than the mean percentage of unique response error activation (37%), 
although not significantly (t(18) = 1.56, p = 0.14). If we take a closer look at 
Table 2 we see that 11 participants showed more activation for task errors 
than for response errors. More importantly, the overall percentage of overlap 
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between both error types was quite small (8%). Further, it seems that this 
figure was mainly based on a relatively strong overlap for only 4 
participants (overlap > 15%) (See Table 2). In order to check that the 
absence of overlap was not due to an inflation of noise, we replicated the 
above analysis with a higher threshold (p < 0.01). From Table 2 it is clear 
that we replicated the above findings; the overall amount of overlap was 
very small, 3%. Only one participant showed an overlap higher than 15%. 
The percentage of unique task error activation (63%) was higher than the 
amount of unique response error activation (33%), t(18) = 2.28, p = 0.04. 
Further, 12 participants showed higher task error activation than response 
error activation. While 1 participant showed low activation for task errors 
(2%), 6 participants showed a low activation for response errors (< 15%). 
Table 2. Percentage of Activation Uniquely Related to Task Errors, Uniquely Related to Re-
sponse Errors and Percentage of Overlap of Both Errors for p = 0.05. Between brackets are 
the values corresponding to a p value of 0.01. 
Participant Total 
number of 
activated 
voxels 
Task error in 
percentage 
Response er-
ror in per-
centage 
Overlap in 
percentage 
1 425 (93) 43 (40) 49 (58) 8 (2) 
2 403 (179) 90 (94) 8 (5) 2 (1) 
3 236 (68) 86 (100) 11 (0) 3 (0) 
4 552 (170) 3 (2) 97 (98) 0 (0) 
5 319 (67) 36 (37) 62 (63) 3 (0) 
6 145 (23) 54 (57) 45 (43) 1 (0) 
7 428 (173) 80 (95) 8 (3) 12 (2) 
8 90 (12) 81 (83) 18 (17) 1 (0) 
9 1204 (699) 68 (83) 13 (9) 19 (8) 
10 223 (48) 26 (21) 73 (79) 2 (0) 
11 227 (41) 23 (51) 73 (49) 4 (0) 
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12 340 (67) 38 (49) 56 (49) 7 (1) 
13 147 (32) 48 (44) 49 (53) 3 (3) 
14 655 (261) 88 (92) 5 (5) 7 (3) 
15 694 (284) 61 (75) 21 (17) 19 (8) 
16 78 (14) 62 (86) 38 (14) 0 (0) 
17 222 (55) 73 (80) 22 (18) 5 (2) 
18 948 (390) 27 (34) 45 (51) 28 (15) 
19 1147 (792) 61(80) 3 (1) 36 (19) 
 
Conflict related activation. In the second part of the analyses we 
investigated brain areas related with response and task conflict. Both 
conflict contrasts (response and task conflict) were designed by contrasting 
correct conflict trials with correct no-conflict trials. More precisely, we 
subtracted correct catch trials from correctly executed stimulus change trials 
and correctly executed task change trials respectively for response and task 
conflict. Because these contrasts also subtract two different screen displays 
a lot of sensory-related brain activity, for example in the occipital lobe 
showed up. Therefore we only report the activated frontal areas. 
The first contrast aimed to look at response conflict. Therefore, we 
subtracted correct catch trials from correct stimulus change trials. An area 
slightly anterior to the left inferior frontal junction (lIFJ,-45 18 27), the RCZ 
(RCZ, -6 30 39), the right middle frontal gyrus (rMFG, 42 27 42), and an 
area in the left frontopolar cortex, the frontomarginal sulcus (lFMS,-36 54 
6) were activated. 
The second contrast aimed at revealing regions related to task 
conflict. We subtracted correct catch trials from correct task change trials. 
The presupplementary motor area (preSMA, -9 15 57) and the right middle 
frontal gyrus (rMFG, 42 54 18) were activated along with a region 
stretching from the premotor cortex (PM, -39 9 60) over an area somewhat 
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anterior to the left inferior frontal junction (lIFJ, -39 15 24) ending in the 
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (lDLPFC, -39 45 3). Figure 6 shows brain 
activity related to response conflict and task conflict.   
Finally, we wanted to see if response and task conflict subserved 
overlapping brain activation. Because task change trials and stimulus change 
trials comprise two completely different types of events, we will not directly 
compare them. However, likewise as in the error contrasts we performed a 
conjunction analysis on the two above contrasts (task and response conflict). 
This should also reveal which brain regions are commonly activated by 
response and task conflict. The conjunction analysis showed that the left 
middle frontal gyrus (lMFG, -36 51 27), and the left IFJ (lIFJ, -39 15 24) 
showed activation for both conflict levels.  
INTEGRATING CONFLICT AND ERRORS 
In the final part of the analyses we will compare conflict and error 
activations for the two different levels of abstractness. In other words, we 
will relate response conflict with response error activation and task conflict 
with task error activation. To this aim we performed two conjunction 
analyses.  
First, we performed a conjunction analysis between the response 
error contrast and the response conflict contrast.  No significant activations 
emerged. This means that in our study there was no significant overlap 
between response conflict activity and response error activity. If we take a 
closer look at the coordinates in the pMPFC related to response conflict and 
response errors we can conclude that response conflict triggers regions 
located more dorsal and more posterior than response errors. 
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Figure 6. Response conflict (blue) and task conflict (green) related activation superimposed 
on anatomical slices averaged across participants. Response conflict is related to the contrast 
stimulus change correct trials – catch correct trials. Task conflict is related to the contrast task 
change correct trials – catch correct trials. (a) Activation in the PM, IFJ and DLPFC for task 
errors (MNI coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, green: x, y, z = -39, 9, 60, Z = 
5.09, x, y, z = -39, 15, 24, Z = 4.75 and x, y, z = -39, 45, 3, Z = 4.94) and activation in the IFJ 
for response errors (MNI coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, blue: x, y, z = -45, 
18, 27, Z = 3.52). Overlapping activity is represented in red in the IFJ and the MFG (MNI 
coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, x, y, z = -39, 15, 24 , Z = 3.62 and x, y, z = -
36, 51, 27, Z = 4.46). (b) Activation in the preSMA for task conflict and in the RCZ for 
response conflict (MNI coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, green: x, y, z = -9, 
15, 57, Z = 4.03 and blue: x, y, z = -6, 30, 39, Z = 3.70). (c) Activation in the MFG for task 
conflict and for response conflict (MNI coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, 
green: x, y, z = 42, 54, 18, Z = 4.09 and blue: x, y, z = 42, 27, 42, Z = 3.43). (d) Activation in 
the IFG for task conflict (MNI coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, x, y, z = -51, 
15, -3 , Z = 4.02). (e) Activation in the frontopolar cortex for response conflict (MNI 
coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, x, y, z = -36, 54, 6, Z = 4.03). 
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In addition, we performed this analysis for each participant separately. We 
defined a region of interest based on the peak coordinates for response 
errors (6, 51, 30) and response conflict (-6, 30, 39) in the pMPFC. We took 
the mean of both coordinates and drew a sphere of 15 mm around this 
centre. As a result, the region extended for the x-axis from -15 to +15, for 
the y-axis from 25 to 55 and for the z-axis from 20 to 50. Similar to the 
individual analyses on task and response errors we computed the percentage 
of brain activity uniquely related to response errors, uniquely related to 
response conflict and the percentage of overlapping activation. The 
threshold was set at p < 0.05 and no smoothing was applied. The overall 
percentage of overlap was minimal (1%). The largest percentage of overlap 
was 3%. Further, the percentage for response error and response conflict 
activity did not differ significantly, 53% and 46% respectively (t(18) < 1). 
Second, we performed a conjunction analysis between the task error 
contrast and the task conflict contrast. As expected from the above task error 
contrast and task conflict contrast, the conjunction analysis showed no 
significant overlap. If we compare the regions associated with task conflict 
and task errors, we see that task conflict regions are located more posterior 
than task error regions.  
See Figure 7 for an overview of the peak activations in the pMPFC 
for task errors, task conflict, response errors and response conflict. 
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Figure 7. Peak activations in the pMPFC for task errors (MNI coordinates of maximal 
random-effect Z scores, x, y, z = 6, 39, 54, Z = 4.45), task conflict (MNI coordinates of 
maximal random-effect Z scores, x, y, z = -9, 15, 57, Z = 4.03), response errors (MNI 
coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, x, y, z = 6, 51, 30, Z = 3.87) and response 
conflict (MNI coordinates of maximal random-effect Z scores, x, y, z = -6, 30, 39, Z = 3.70). 
To represent all activations on the same figure all activations were mapped on an x-value of 0. 
Task related activation is presented in green and response related activation is presented in 
blue. Error related activation is presented as squares and conflict related activation is 
presented as circles. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this paper we investigated errors and conflict at two levels of 
abstractness. Our data show that task and response errors activate a region in 
the pMPFC that stretches from the rostral cingulate zone to the dorsal 
frontomedian cortex. A conjunction analysis on the group level revealed an 
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overlap in brain activation for both types of errors. However, an 
investigation on the individual level did not support the conclusion of a 
strong overlap. Furthermore, the differential pattern of brain activation 
outside the pMPFC supports the hypothesis that task and response errors are 
related to different neural substrates. The second part of the analysis, 
comparing response and task conflict, also revealed a clear dissociation of 
the task and the response level. It seems that task conflict activates regions 
more posteriorly located than response conflict. However, it seems that both 
conflict types also share some overlapping activations outside the pMPFC 
such as the IFJ and the MFG. In the last part of the analysis we compared 
conflict and error processing within each level of abstractness. For both 
levels it seems that there is no overlap between conflict and errors. In 
addition, error activated regions seem to be located more anterior than 
conflict related regions. Further, this distinction is more salient at the task 
level than at the response level.  A final point that supports the dissociation 
between the task and response level is provided by the behavioural data. It 
seems that participants are slower on task than on response errors (p = 0.07). 
In addition, response times are higher on task conflict than on response 
conflict trials. Even on subsequent trials the effect of task conflict is 
stronger than the effect of response conflict (p = 0.06), while it does not 
make a difference if a task error or a response error was made on the 
previous trial. In line with the fMRI data this shows that the difference 
between task and response processing is more expressed at the conflict level 
than at the error level.  
DISSOCIATING TASK AND RESPONSE ERRORS 
In the present study we found a distinction of task and response 
errors in the pMPFC. From the individual analysis it is clear that most 
participants do not show an overlap in response and task error activation. 
The question now is if we can dissociate both error regions anatomically. In 
accordance with our hypothesis, the data suggest that response errors rely on 
areas in the pMPFC that have a strong link to the motor system while task 
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errors rely on areas in the pMPFC that are associated with more abstract 
processing. This dissociation is in accordance with the existing literature on 
task related and response related processes. As mentioned in the 
introduction response errors have been associated with ventral parts of the 
pMPFC, especially the RCZ (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von 
Cramon, 2004). On the other hand in task related studies more dorsal 
regions such as the preSMA (Brass & von Cramon, 2002; Crone, 
Wendelken, Donohue, & Bunge, 2006; Rushworth, Hadland, Paus, & Sipila, 
2002) seem to play an important role. The task error region that we 
described in the pMPFC (dFMC, dorsal frontomedian cortex) is more 
anterior to the preSMA and has been described in higher level decision 
processes. It seems that this region is involved under conditions were 
abstract rules have to be applied to a certain stimulus. For example, Volz 
and colleagues reported this region when participants where highly 
uncertain about their decisions compared to situations where participants 
could recollect their decisions from memory (Volz, Schubotz, & von 
Cramon, 2003; Volz, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2004). Further, in a study of 
Goel and Dolan (2000) the dFMC was active if participants had to derive a 
classification rule themselves while there was no dFMC activity when 
participants had to classify stimuli based on predetermined features. In a 
similar experiment of Elliott and Dolan (1998) the dFMC was activated 
under situations of rule searching. Finally, Rushworth et al. (2002) reported 
the dFMC in situations where participants had to switch between different 
stimulus-response rules. In line with our results this suggests that the task 
error region is related to abstract processing. However, one should be 
cautious of the fact that activation in the dFMC was also found for response 
errors. Although this activation was not as strong as for task errors and was 
more posteriorly located, we cannot conclude that task errors exclusively 
activate dorsal regions and response errors exclusively activate ventral 
regions. However, we can conclude that both error types activate different 
subregions in the pMPFC.  
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From the individual analyses it seems that some participants show 
larger percentages for task errors while others show the opposite pattern. 
Such effects might be due to strategies in response selection. In previous 
research using univalent stimulus-response mappings it was shown that 
some participants first select the correct hand and then the correct finger 
while others first select the correct fingers (for example both middle fingers) 
and then the correct hand (Bernstein, Scheffers, & Coles, 1995). It was 
demonstrated that hand preference subjects (those who first select their 
hand) show larger error-related negativity to hand errors and vice versa. 
Mapped on our results this could explain why some participants have larger 
activation for task errors and others have larger activation for response 
errors in the individual analyses (if task errors are considered as hand errors 
and response errors as finger errors). However, unlike these previous 
studies, where only one task with four possible responses was offered, we 
offered two different tasks with each two possible responses. In addition, 
participants could already start preparing the task and the concurrent hand 
before information about the correct finger was forehand.   
Further evidence for a differentiation between task and response 
errors is provided by the different brain networks both errors activate. 
Besides the prefrontal areas we found activation in the rMTG and the rINS 
for response errors and activation in the rIPL for task errors. The rMTG has 
been related to colour processing (Chao & Martin, 1999; Simmons, Ramjee, 
Beauchamp, McRae, Martin, & Barsalou, 2007). Presumably, this activation 
thus resulted from the changing colour situations in the stimulus change 
trials. The activation of the rINS on the other hand is probably related to the 
response switches made during stimulus change trials, as this region has 
been related to response switching (Paulus, Feinstein, Leland, & Simmons, 
2005). As regards the rIPL activation, this region has been linked to the 
maintenance of current task goals and the processing of new task 
information (Singh-Curry & Husain, 2009). In the task error contrast two 
task switching situations were subtracted from one another. Thus, like 
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Singh-Curry and Husain (2009) we find support for the role of the IPL in 
flexible adaptive behaviour. 
It should be mentioned that the response errors in our study were 
evoked in a different way than is usually done in the literature. Usually, 
response errors are elicited by the use of an interference paradigm such as 
the flanker task. However, in our study we wanted to elicit both errors in the 
same way so that the differences between them were kept as small as 
possible. Therefore response errors were also elicited by means of a stop 
change signal. One could argue that in this way we elicit another type of 
error than the response errors usually described. Further, the activation 
correlated with response errors was located more dorsal and more anterior in 
our study compared to the activation generally found for response errors. 
However, if we compared the response error activation in the pMPFC to the 
cluster of performance monitoring activation described by Ridderinkhof and 
colleagues (2004) our response error activation clusters were still situated in 
this zone. At first sight, the dFMC activation could be explained by the 
inhibition procedure we used. Similar dFMC activation was namely found in 
a stop signal study (Li, Huang, Constable, & Sinha, 2006). In a follow up 
study stopping was impaired when this region was disrupted by transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (Chen, Muggleton, Tzeng, Hung, & Juan, 2009). 
However, the fact that we found a distinction between the task and the 
response level shows that we do not merely assess inhibition processes but 
rather response and task related processes.  
DISSOCIATING TASK AND RESPONSE CONFLICT 
In addition to the error contrasts we performed conflict contrasts. 
Whereas response conflict activated the RCZ, the lIFJ, the rMFG and the 
lFMS, task conflict was associated with the preSMA, the PM, the lIFJ, the 
lDLPFC and the rMFG. The activation of the left frontopolar cortex in the 
response conflict contrast is probably related to the fact that we compared 
changing stimuli. Pollmann and colleagues already associated left 
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frontopolar cortex with changes in visual dimension (Pollmann, 2000; 
Pollmann, Weidner, Muller, & von Cramon, 2000). The RCZ is often 
reported as a response conflict region, whereas task conflict seems to be 
correlated with regions associated with more abstract cognitive processes 
such as the preSMA and the premotor cortex (Abe, Hanakawa, Takayama, 
Kuroki, Ogawa, & Fukuyama, 2007). This anterior-posterior dissociation is 
partly reproduced in our response and task conflict related brain regions. 
However these effects should be treated with care since the conflict 
contrasts subtract two different trial types from each other. That is, we 
compared trials in which a secondary ellipse or stimulus is presented with 
trials where there are no secondary changes.  
INTEGRATING 2 DIMENSIONS 
Overall, we found that depending on the level at which an error 
occurs different brain regions are activated. This suggests that an error is 
more than a general comparison between an intended and an actual outcome. 
In addition, the dissociation in brain activity between different levels of 
errors could point to the difference in adjustments they apply for. The same 
conclusion can be formed based on our conflict results. Namely, different 
forms of conflict are correlated with different brain areas. This is in line 
with recent findings showing that the medial prefrontal cortex interacts with 
the lateral prefrontal cortex in a parallel hierarchical way to provide control 
(Kouneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009).  
Finally, we replicated the dissociation between conflict and errors at 
the response level. It seems that response errors activate regions more 
ventral and more anterior than response conflict areas. In addition, we found 
that conflict and errors were even more pronouncedly dissociated at the task 
level.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
ERROR ADAPTATION IN MENTAL ARITHMETIC1 
 
Until now, error and conflict adaptation have been studied 
extensively using simple laboratory tasks. A common finding is that 
responses slow down after errors. According to the conflict monitoring 
theory, performance should also improve after an error. However, this is 
usually not observed. In this study, we investigated if the characteristics of 
the experimental paradigms normally used could explain this absence. More 
precisely, these paradigms have in common that behavioural adaptation has 
little room to be expressed. We therefore studied error and conflict 
adaptation effects in a task that encounters the richness of everyday life’s 
behavioural adaptation, namely mental arithmetic, where multiple solution 
strategies are available. In accordance with our hypothesis, we observed 
post-error accuracy increases after errors in mental arithmetic. No support 
for conflict adaptation in mental arithmetic was found. Implications for 
current theories of conflict and error monitoring are discussed.  
                                                     
1
Desmet, C., Imbo, I., De Brauwer, J., Brass, M., Fias, W., & Notebaert, W. (in 
press). Error adaptation in mental arithmetic. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades, a lot of research has been conducted on how 
we adapt our behaviour following errors. A well replicated finding is that 
response times slow down after we encounter an error. This has served as 
evidence for adaptive control mechanisms taking place after an error. More 
specifically, an error is assumed to alter the point on the speed-accuracy 
trade off curve to a more conservative level, such that behaviour will be 
slower but more accurate (e.g., Brewer & Smith, 1984; Brewer & Smith, 
1989, Rabbitt, 1979). These ideas have been integrated in current accounts 
of error monitoring. For example the conflict monitoring account, explains 
post-error slowing in terms of an increase in response thresholds after an 
error or conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). 
According to these traditional accounts, response times will thus slow down 
and accuracy will increase after an error. Although post-error accuracy 
increases have been reported in some studies (e.g., Danielmeier, Eichele, 
Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011; Laming, 1968; Marco-
Pallares, Camara, Munte, & Rodriguez-Fornells, 2008; Seifert, von Cramon, 
Imperati, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011), other studies failed to find post-
error accuracy increases (e.g., Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003, Hajcak 
& Simons, 2008; King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010; Notebaert & 
Verguts, 2011) or even observed post-error accuracy decreases (e.g., Fiehler, 
Ullsperger, & von Cramon, 2005; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). This 
contradiction was addressed by Notebaert, Houtman, Van Opstal, Gevers, 
Fias and Verguts (2009). According to these authors, it is not the erroneous 
nature of the (incorrect) response but the fact that it occurs infrequently that 
explains post-error slowing. More precisely, an infrequent event attracts 
attention away from the task and in this way slows down subsequent 
processing. Notebaert and colleagues (2009) confirmed this hypothesis by 
showing post-error slowing after infrequent errors, but post-correct slowing 
after infrequent correct responses. In addition, they showed that irrelevant 
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and infrequent sounds also slowed down performance on subsequent trials. 
In sum, according to these authors, post-error slowing should be considered 
as an attentional effect (or an orienting response) rather than as an 
adaptation effect. In contrast to the conflict monitoring account, these 
authors do not predict post-error accuracy increases but rather post-error 
accuracy decreases. Indeed, because infrequent events such as errors capture 
attention, task processing will be impaired, resulting in post-error accuracy 
decreases.  
 In the laboratory, error monitoring has been studied extensively with a 
wide range of tasks. Typically, in these tasks, different stimuli are mapped 
in an arbitrary way onto different responses. For example, a red square has 
to be responded with a left button and a green square with a right button. To 
fulfill such a task it is important to notice the difference between the stimuli, 
to remember the stimulus-response mappings and to push the according 
button appropriately. Thus, correct task performance in these tasks, 
comprises a correct identification of the stimulus and the selection and 
execution of the corresponding button. In the remaining part of the 
manuscript we will refer to these tasks as direct mapping tasks.  
However, in daily life, appropriate behaviour is not only determined 
by a simple stimulus. Often, more complex cognitive processes are required, 
e.g., when multiple solution strategies are possible. For example when a 
traffic light suddenly turns orange, you can choose between stopping or 
driving through. However, the behaviour that will eventually be chosen will 
not only depend on the stimulus (the orange light) but also on other factors; 
the police car next to you, the fact that you are already late for an 
appointment, your driving speed,... It is clear that, depending on the 
situation, some strategies are more efficient than others. So in contrast to 
direct mapping tasks, the stimulus identification in itself is not enough to 
elicit the most efficient behaviour. In parallel, error adaptation in direct 
mapping tasks will be restricted to specific strategies, namely paying more 
attention to the relevant stimulus and refreshing the appropriate stimulus-
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response mappings. For example, consider a task where participants should 
respond with a left button to the digit 3 and with a right button to the digit 8. 
When the digit 3 is categorized incorrectly with the right button, the only 
possible strategy to prevent this error in the future, is to pay more attention 
to the presented digit and to recall the rule: 3-left, 8-right. In a way, there is 
thus not much to do after an error has been made, except for looking more 
attentively to the screen and to remember the response rules. Therefore, 
post-error effects, measured in direct mapping tasks might indeed only 
reflect an orienting response (as suggested by Notebaert et al., 2009). 
However, error adaptation in more complex situations should not be 
restricted to an attention increase or rule refreshment and might therefore 
elicit, besides an orientation response, also an improvement in behaviour 
(post-error accuracy increase). Unfortunately, such more complex tasks have 
largely been neglected in classical error monitoring research. In this paper 
we will fill this gap and investigate error adaptation effects in a more 
complex and daily used task that involves more cognitive processes and 
permits a selection between different strategies, namely mental arithmetic. 
Participants were asked to verify simple multiplication problems (e.g., 4 x 6 
= 24 correct / false?). Different strategies have been documented in the 
verification of multiplications. Besides retrieving the answer from memory 
and comparing the retrieved answer to the presented one, participants can 
also use different rules to verify the presented solutions. For example, the 
‘five rule’ comprises that when one of the operands is 5, the product should 
have 0 or 5 as a final digit (Campbell & Graham, 1985; Siegler, 1988). 
Another example is the ‘parity rule’, which states that if at least one of the 
operands is even, the outcome must also be even (Krueger, 1986; Lemaire & 
Fayol, 1995; Lemaire & Reder, 1999; Masse & Lemaire, 2001). (For other 
examples of strategies in arithmetic verification see Ashcraft & Stazyk, 
1981; Winkelman & Schmidt, 1974; Zbrodoff & Logan, 1986). 
The advantage of using multiplication verification (and not 
production or another operation, like addition) is that we can manipulate the 
table relatedness of the presented distracters. As we know from previous 
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studies, it is more difficult to reject a closely related distracter (e.g., 4 x 6 = 
28) compared to an unrelated distracter (e.g., 4 x 6 = 14) (Campbell, 1987; 
Stazyk, Ashcraft, & Hamann, 1982). The idea of a multiplication ‘network’ 
in which activation spreading is at work, is now generally accepted 
(Ashcraft, 1987; Campbell, 1995; McCloskey & Lindemann, 1992; Verguts 
& Fias, 2005) and explains the influence of table relatedness in a 
verification task. Hence, in the present study we defined ‘conflict’ in terms 
of table relatedness: 4 x 6 = 14 is a low conflict trial since 14 is not related 
to the table of 4 nor to the table of 6. On the other hand, 4 x 6 = 28 is a high 
conflict trial since 28 belongs to the table of 4 (4 x 7). Further, our high 
conflict trials were always one step away from the correct outcome (4 x 
(6+1) = 28) to maximize the amount of conflict (further called ‘distance 1 
distracters’). In this study, conflict is thus defined as the distance between 
the correct answer and the presented answer. Consequently, conflict is not 
defined at a response level or at a stimulus level, as is the case in most 
laboratory tasks, but at a higher cognitive level.  
A robust finding in the cognitive control literature is the fact that 
interference effects (the difference between high and low conflict trials) are 
smaller after conflicting stimuli. This effect was initially demonstrated by 
Gratton, Coles and Donchin (1992) in the flanker task and has now been 
observed in a wide range of tasks (Simon tasks: Sturmer, Leuthold, Soetens, 
Schroter, & Sommer, 2002, Stroop tasks: Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2004, and prime-target congruency effects: Kunde, 
2003). The logic behind this observation is that conflict trials call for more 
control and therefore cause benefits on subsequent trials. A recent model for 
conflict adaptation by Verguts and Notebaert (2009) explains conflict 
adaptation by a strengthening of S-R associations (e.g., target arrow pointing 
leftwards means left response) at the moment conflict is detected. The 
crucial aspect of this Hebbian-like model is that only associations that are 
active at the time conflict is detected, will be strengthened. In mental 
arithmetic, there is support that “4 x 6” will activate certain table related 
solutions (Campbell, 1987; Stazyk et al., 1982) but given the large amount 
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of arithmetic problems and solutions, it is unlikely that performance on the 
immediately subsequent trial will benefit from this strengthened activation. 
In other words, what is the advantage of strengthening “4 x 6 = 24”, if on the 
next trial “5 x 3 = 18” is presented? Consequently, no conflict adaptation 
effects are expected. 
In sum, conflict and error monitoring theories are based on studies 
using direct mapping tasks, in which paying more attention to the crucial 
stimulus and refreshing the stimulus-response rules are the only way in 
which performance can be increased. Although post-error effects have been 
depicted as markers of adaptive behaviour, not all data are in line with this 
hypothesis (i.e., the absence of post-error accuracy increases). Recent 
accounts even question the adaptive nature attributed to post-error effects 
(Notebaert et al., 2009). However, we believe that the use of more complex 
tasks (i.e., in which multiple solution strategies are possible) might provide 
additional information to this debate. More precisely, because behavioural 
adaptation is very limited in direct mapping tasks, post-error effects in these 
tasks might predominantly reflect an orienting response. However, in more 
complex everyday tasks, behaviour can be adapted in a countless number of 
ways. In other words, there is more room to improve subsequent behaviour. 
One of the tasks where we expect post-error adjustments to be more than a 
generic slowing down is mental arithmetic. After an error in this task, 
participants have the opportunity to change strategies in order to improve 
performance. Subsequently, we expect post-error accuracy increases in 
addition to post-error slowing in mental arithmetic. Finally, due to the large 
amount of different stimuli and responses in our task, we predict no conflict 
adaptation in mental arithmetic.  
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
35 students at Ghent University (16 females) participated in this 
study (mean age = 19.3 years, SD = 1.2 years). The majority of the 
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participants earned course credits in exchange for participation. The other 
participants were paid 8 euro. 
MATERIAL 
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch computer screen. The viewing 
distance was about 50 cm. The multiplication problems were centered on the 
screen in the traditional format (e.g., 3 x 7 = 21) and presented in white on a 
black background (total outline: 4.2 cm x 0.6 cm). Responses were recorded 
by response boxes. The experiment was conducted using Tscope software 
(Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006).   
STIMULI 
Three different types of multiplication problems were presented. 
Half the trials comprised problems presented with a correct solution 
(CORRECT: 4 x 6 = 24). The other half of the trials comprised problems 
presented with an incorrect solution (distracters). For the incorrect solutions, 
we manipulated the distance from the correct solution in the multiplication 
network. More precisely, in one fourth of the trials the distracter was one 
step away from the correct solution (DISTANCE 1: 4 x 6 = 28), whereas in 
the other fourth of the trials the distracter was unrelated to the correct 
solution (UNRELATED: 4 x 6 = 21). Transitions between these different 
trial types were pseudo-randomized over the experiment, in such a way that 
every possible transition occurred equally often. We selected problems 
ranging from 2 x 3 until 8 x 9. Tie problems were not included. This resulted 
in 28 problems. For unrelated distracters one unrelated outcome was chosen 
for each of the 28 problems. Every problem occurred in both the ‘larger x 
smaller’ and the ‘smaller x larger’ order. This resulted in 56 unique 
problems for correct and unrelated problem types. For correct problems, 
these 56 problems were repeated 8 times over the experiment, for unrelated 
problems they were repeated 4 times. For distance 1 distracters we included 
four different outcomes for each of the 28 problems: (a+1) x b; (a-1) x b; a x 
(b+1); a x (b-1). For distance 1 distracters, there were thus four lists of 28 
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problems
2
. Including the order of larger operand first /smaller operand first, 
there were 224 problems for distance 1 distracters. Every problem was 
repeated once during the experiment. In practice the four different distance 1 
lists sometimes contained the same distracters. This was the case for 
problems with 2 or 9 as one of the operands (e.g., 2 x 7 or 9 x 3) because 
problems with 1 (e.g., (2-1) x 7) or 10 as one of the operands (e.g., (9+1) x 
3) were excluded from the stimulus set. In total, there were 896 
experimental trials.  
A number of restrictions were imposed on the stimuli. First of all, 
we ensured that the ‘split’ (i.e., the magnitude difference between the 
presented distracter and the correct product, Ashcraft & Stazyk, 1981; 
Koshmider & Ashcraft, 1991) did not differ significantly between distance 1 
distracters (mean split = 5.5) and unrelated distracters (M = 4.5), t(27) = 
1.42, p =.17. Second, the direction of the split was controlled: half of the 
distracters was larger than the correct product, the other half was smaller 
than the correct product, for both distracter types. Third, the magnitude of 
the presented distracters did not differ significantly between distance 1 (M = 
29.63) and unrelated distracters (M = 28.39), t(27) = 1.23, p =.23. 
                                                     
2 Because there were four possible distance-1 solutions per problem and only one 
possible unrelated solution per problem, we repeated all analyses restricted to the da-
ta gathered in the first block, thus only including the first presentation of both solu-
tion types. All results were replicated, indicating that the different presentation fre-
quency of high and low conflict was not responsible for the pattern of results. 
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PROCEDURE 
Participants had to classify multiplication problems as correct or 
incorrect by pressing a button with their left or right index finger. The 
response mappings were counterbalanced between subjects.  
In total there were four blocks of 226 trials resulting in 904 
experimental trials. The experiment started with 8 practice trials. There was 
a short break after every block. During the break the mean reaction time of 
the participant appeared on the screen. The experiment lasted about 40 
minutes. Participants were instructed to respond both fast and accurately. 
Each trial started with the presentation of the following fixation 
mark ‘!’ for 500 ms. Then the verification problem appeared on the screen 
until participants responded or until the response deadline of 1500 ms had 
passed. After a correct response, a green circle was presented for 500 ms 
while after an erroneous response a red circle appeared. If participants did 
not answer within the response interval the words ‘TE TRAAG’ (too slow) 
appeared on the screen for 500 ms. After a blank screen of 300 ms the 
following trial started, resulting in a response stimulus interval of 1300 ms. 
RESULTS 
Three participants were removed from the analyses. The error rates 
of two participants were larger than 2 SD’s from the overall mean. The data 
of the third outlier indicated guessing behaviour, shown by a lot of (23%) 
very fast (< 200 ms) responses. The mean response time of the remaining 32 
participants was 832 ms (SD = 93 ms). The mean error rate was 14% (SD = 
5%). Correct trials (in which a problem was presented with its correct 
product) were not included in the analyses since they only served as control 
trials. In the final dataset we thus only included unrelated and distance 1 
trials. Furthermore, responses exceeding the response deadline were 
discarded (3%, SD = 4%). We also excluded responses following these trials 
(3%, SD = 4%). In addition, errors on the current trial (17%, SD = 8%) were 
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removed for response time analyses. For each dependent variable (RTs and 
accuracy) we first compared post-correct performance with post-error 
performance by means of a paired samples t-test. Second, we looked at 
conflict adaptation effects by means of a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
on post-correct trials including the factors INTERFERENCE N-1 (trial n-1 
unrelated versus trial n-1 distance 1) and INTERFERENCE (unrelated 
versus distance 1). In the first section, we report the results for response 
times. In the second section, the results for accuracy rates are described.  
RESPONSE TIMES 
Response times for error trials (882 ms, SD = 114 ms) were 
significantly slower than for correct trials (855 ms, SD = 98 ms), t(31) = 
2.52, p < 0.05. Participants responded slower after an error (951 ms, SD = 
93 ms) than after a correct response (874 ms, SD = 103 ms), t(31) = -6.37, p 
< 0.001. See Figure 1. Further, the expected interference effect emerged. 
Participants were slower on distance 1 trials (897 ms, SD = 107 ms) than on 
unrelated trials (851 ms, SD = 105 ms), F(1,31) = 81.44, p < 0.001. 
However, the main effect of INTERFERENCE N-1 and the interaction 
between INTERFERENCE N-1 and INTERFERENCE did not reach 
significance, Fs < 1. Mean response times are shown in Table 1. 
ACCURACY 
Participants were more accurate after an error (84%, SD = 8%) than 
after a correct response (81%, SD = 8%), t(31) = -2.86, p = 0.01, see Figure 
1.  
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Figure 1. Mean response times (in ms) and accuracy rates (in percentage) on trials following a 
correct response (post-correct) or an error (post-error).  
 
Further, participants were less accurate on distance 1 trials (75%, 
SD = 10%) than on unrelated trials (87%, SD = 8%), F(1,31) = 125.74, p < 
0.001. There was no main effect of INTERFERENCE N-1, F < 1. The 
interaction between INTERFERENCE N-1 and INTERFERENCE was 
significant, F(1,31) = 8.71, p = 0.01. However, the results do not support 
reduction of interference after high conflict. Rather they point into the 
opposite direction: there is more interference after distance 1 trials than after 
unrelated trials. Mean accuracy rates are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Mean response times in ms and accuracy rates (between brackets) in percentages, for 
previous trial type (unrelated and distance 1) and current trial type (unrelated and distance 1).  
 Current trial 
 Unrelated Distance 1 
Previous trial   
Unrelated 851 (0.86) 894 (0.76) 
Distance 1 850 (0.89) 900 (0.74) 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The simplified nature of laboratory tasks might have narrowed the 
perspective on error monitoring. Moreover, post-error accuracy increases are 
not always observed in direct mapping tasks. As a result, post-error effects 
in these tasks (i.e., post-error slowing) have been explained by attentional 
effects (i.e., orienting to the error, attracting attention away from the task) 
rather than by adaptation effects. Our data suggest that in a more complex 
task, i.e., tasks where multiple solution strategies are possible and where 
people can adjust their behaviour by flexibly switching between these 
strategies, attentional effects are not sufficient to explain the data pattern. In 
sum, post-error adaptation effects (such as post-error accuracy increases) 
might predominantly be observed in more complex tasks, as shown in the 
present study.  
The difference in complexity between our task and direct mapping 
tasks is also expressed in the response times on errors. Namely, we found 
larger response times on errors compared to correct responses in mental 
arithmetic. In direct mapping tasks, where one strategy (i.e., paying more 
attention to the stimulus and refreshing the stimulus-response rules) is the 
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only way to improve performance, an error will primarily result from 
insufficient processing time. Errors in direct mapping tasks thus typically 
emerge on fast trials. However, in tasks that do not only rely on stimulus 
identification, errors will primarily occur on difficult trials (i.e., 
multiplication problems where the correct solution is not that 
straightforward) compared to trials where participants can immediately 
recollect the correct solution from memory. Consequently, over the whole 
experiment errors will be slower than correct responses. 
Further, to investigate conflict adaptation, we manipulated the 
relatedness of the distracters: distance 1 distracters were responded slower 
and less accurate than unrelated distracters. However, reduction of 
interference after high conflict was not observed. This indicates that conflict 
adaptation, a process at work in direct mapping tasks, might not be at work 
in more complex tasks. In the introduction we argued that on the basis of 
associative control models (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009), one would not 
predict conflict adaptation in mental arithmetic, or any other task consisting 
of multiple stimuli and responses (e.g., Braem, Verguts & Notebaert, 2011). 
This is in line with our findings. On accuracy rates, the results even pointed 
into the opposite direction. Interference was reduced after unrelated trials 
compared to distance 1 trials. At first sight these results might seem odd. 
However, in a recent ERP-study, Tzur and Berger (2007) showed that theta 
activity, a measure expressing anterior cingulate cortex activity in error and 
conflict detection (Luu, Tucker, & Makeig, 2004), is related to the salience 
of the rule violation in mental arithmetic. More precisely, a larger deviation 
from the correct response was related to more theta activity. In our 
experiment, unrelated distracters were more salient violations from the 
correct response than were distance 1 distracters. That is, distance 1 
distracters are still related to the multiplication table of one of the operands, 
whereas unrelated distracters are not related to the operands. In other words, 
salience and conflict are not confounded in our design. In contrast, in direct 
mapping tasks high conflict trials are often also the most salient trials. Our 
results thus might suggest that interference effects are reduced after more 
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salient events. This implicates that not the level of conflict but rather the 
salience of the event is important to reduce interference effects. Of course, 
future research is necessary to investigate this possibility. 
Taken together, the present study shows that it is crucial to 
investigate error processing and conflict adaptation in tasks that resemble 
daily situations of flexible behaviour. Not all effects found in direct 
mapping tasks can be generalized to more complex tasks. We are convinced 
that broadening the domain by extending the sort of tasks being used, will 
gain new and interesting insights in the human ability of cognitive control, 
decision making, and flexible behaviour.  
Besides the broader view on cognitive control processes our study 
provides some important implications for research in mental arithmetic. 
Traditionally, researchers in this domain focus on RTs of correct responses 
and on percentages of errors (e.g., Campbell & Xue, 2001; Imbo & 
Vandierendonck, 2007a,b; LeFevre, Bisanz, Daley, Buffone, Greenham, & 
Sadesky, 1996; Seitz & Schumann-Hengsteler, 2000; Siegler & Lemaire, 
1997; Smith-Chant & LeFevre, 2003; etc.). Mostly, response times after 
errors are not discarded from the analyses. Nonetheless, errors are not that 
infrequent in mental arithmetic. For example, in a multiplication production 
task under time pressure, adults make between 1% and 35% errors (De 
Brauwer, Verguts & Fias, 2006; Imbo & Vandierendonck, 2010; Smith-
Chant & LeFevre, 2003; Verguts & Fias, 2005). Future studies in the field 
of mental arithmetic need to be aware of post-error effects. More 
specifically, we would suggest removing not only error trials but also trials 
that follow errors.  
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 CHAPTER 5 
WHEN THE COFFEE MACHINE IS WRONG: THE ROLE 
OF THE MEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX IN ERROR 
OBSERVATION1 
 
Recent research suggests that similar brain areas in the posterior 
medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC) are active when we make errors 
ourselves and when we observe erroneous behaviour of other people. This 
has led to the conclusion that monitoring errors of other people might be 
achieved by motor simulation of these errors. This raises the fundamental 
question how we are able to detect errors of machines, that we cannot 
simulate in our motor system? Here we show that observing machine errors 
activates the same region in pMPFC than observing human errors, 
indicating that medial prefrontal brain circuits are not only dedicated to 
monitor human errors. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the crucial 
mechanism involved in error monitoring is based on indentifying violations 
of expectancies. These findings have far reaching implications for our 
understanding of how we identify erroneous events in the environment. Our 
data suggest that a domain general mechanism of monitoring violations of 
expectancies allows us to identify errors in humans and machines. 
                                                     
1
This manuscript has been submitted for publication and is co-authored by Eliane 
Deschrijver and Marcel Brass 
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INTRODUCTION 
Detecting errors is extremely crucial to adapt our behaviour to the 
environment. We learn from our own and other people’s errors. Given the 
importance of being able to detect errors, it is not surprising that there is a 
brain system in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC) dedicated to 
this function (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; 
Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004). Interestingly, pMPFC is also activated 
when we observe other humans making errors (de Bruijn, de Lange, von 
Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2009; Manthey, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003; 
Newman-Norlund, Ganesh, van Schie, de Bruijn, & Bekkering, 2009; Shane, 
Stevens, Harenski, & Kiehl, 2008). This shared brain activity during error 
observation and error execution has been suggested to reflect an internal 
simulation of an observed error (e.g., Bates, Patel, & Liddle, 2005; 
Bekkering, de Bruijn, Cuijpers, Newman-Norlund, van Schie, & 
Meulenbroek, 2009; van Schie, Mars, Coles, & Bekkering, 2004). But what 
happens if we observe errors that we cannot simulate such as errors of 
machines? Do such errors also active pMPFC? In the current functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study we investigated this question by 
contrasting brain activity related to the observation of errors than can be 
simulated with brain activity related to the observation of errors that cannot 
be simulated. More precisely, we used functional brain imaging while 
participants observed daily life human-machine interactions that resulted in 
correct or erroneous situations. The reason for these errors could be twofold. 
First, the human caused the error by incorrectly operating the machine 
(human error). Second, the error could be caused by a malfunctioning of the 
machine (machine error). If pMPFC is uniquely activated during the 
observation of human errors, this would lend further support to the 
simulation hypothesis. On the other hand, if we find pMPFC in both 
conditions, the role of this brain area in error observation has to be 
considered more general.  
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METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty-three participants (19 females) participated in the 
experiment (mean age = 21.3 years, SD = 2.2 years). All participants were 
paid 25 euro for their participation. They were all right handed as was 
measured by the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All participants gave 
written informed consent and had no history of neurological disorders. 
Ethical approval was given by the Medical Ethical Review Board of the 
Ghent University hospital. 
STIMULI AND DESIGN 
The experiment was implemented using Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, NY, USA). Every trial consisted of a 
short movie, showing a daily situation of a human-machine interaction. 
Eight different situations were presented in the study (coffee machine, 
elevator, photocamera, electronic garage door, semi-automatic doors, 
vending machine, photocopier and digital clock). According to the 
characteristics of the human-machine interaction, three conditions were 
specified. First, the person could perform a correct action after which the 
machine would produce the correct outcome (CORRECT). For example, in 
the coffee machine situation the person would press the correct button on 
the machine after which the machine would pour the coffee correctly into 
the cup. Second, the person could perform an incorrect action resulting in an 
incorrect outcome (HUMAN ERROR). In the example of the coffee 
machine, the person would press the button corresponding to two cups of 
coffee. As a result, too much coffee is being poured into the cup and the 
coffee is spilled. Third, the person could perform a correct action, leading 
however to an incorrect outcome produced by the machine (MACHINE 
ERROR). Considering the above- mentioned example, the person would 
press the button for one cup of coffee, but nevertheless too much coffee is 
poured into the cup and again the coffee is spilled.   
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Human errors become apparent from the moment the person 
performs the incorrect action. The erroneous result of this action will thus be 
expected. Machine errors on the other hand, are not caused by an incorrect 
human action. Therefore, these errors are not expected in the series of 
ongoing events. An additional difference between human errors and 
machine errors is thus the predictability of the erroneous outcome. However, 
because this problem is inherent to the characteristics of the errors (namely; 
a machine error will always be unexpected, whereas a human error is the 
results of an incorrect action) we controlled for this issue by including an 
extra condition in which the correct action and outcome were presented but 
where an unexpected object, unrelated to the situation, appeared on the 
screen (EXPECTATION). In the above example, this would mean that there 
is an unrelated picture (for example a chair) presented in one of the 
quadrants of the screen at the moment the coffee is poured into the cup. 
Eight different objects were used in the 8 different situations. Furthermore, 
over the whole experiment, the objects were presented equally often in each 
quadrant of the computer screen. The picture remained on the screen until 
the movie ended. If a difference in brain activity between human errors and 
machine errors can be explained by the unexpected nature of a machine 
error, we should also find this activity in the expectation condition.   
In total, there were 32 unique trials (8 situations x 4 conditions). 
These trials were repeated three times resulting in 96 experimental trials. 
The duration of each movie was dependent on the situation and the 
condition (mean duration = 28.22 sec, SD = 9.50 sec). However, for each 
situation we constructed a video clip that was very similar for the four 
conditions (correct, human error, machine error and expectation). Only the 
crucial event was changed (for example the moment of the action). In this 
way, the movies belonging to the different conditions were kept as equal as 
possible. To make sure participants paid attention to the videos, we 
sometimes asked a question about the previously presented video clip. Over 
the whole experiment, 8 questions were asked. These questions were 
divided over the 8 different situations and over the 4 conditions. The 
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question always resulted in a multiple choice answer with 4 possibilities. 
The questions were presented in white on a black background. The trials 
preceding a question were discarded from the analysis, resulting in 88 
experimental trials.   
PROCEDURE 
Participants were lying in the scanner while they attentively 
watched the movies. Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation 
cross for 200 ms, after which the movie started. The intertrial interval was 
varied in a pseudo logarithmic fashion. Using steps of 300 ms, 50% of the 
trials used a jitter ranging from 200 to 1100 ms, 30% of the trials used a 
jitter ranging from 1400 to 2300 ms and 20% of the trials used a jitter 
ranging from 2600 to 3500. The mean interval was 1250 ms. When a 
question was presented on the screen, participants had to respond by means 
of two response boxes that were placed on their upper legs. Responses were 
given with the index and middle fingers of each hand. The mapping of the 
responses to the different answers of the multiple choice question was 
indicated on the screen. A short break was inserted in the middle of the 
experiment.  
FMRI METHODS 
The experiment was carried out on a 3T scanner (Siemens Trio) using 
an 8-channel radiofrequency head coil. Subjects were positioned head first 
and supine in the magnet bore. First, 176 high-resolution anatomical images 
were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence (TR = 2530 ms, 
TE = 2.58 ms, image matrix = 256 ×256, FOV = 220 mm, flip angle = 7º, 
slice thickness = 0.90 mm, voxel size = 0.9 ×0.86 × 0.86 mm (resized to 
1×1×1 mm)). Whole brain functional images were collected using a T2*-
weighted EPI sequence, sensitive to BOLD contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE =35 
ms, image matrix = 64 × 64, FOV = 224 mm, flip angle = 80º, slice 
thickness = 3.0 mm, distance factor = 17%, voxel size 3.5 × 3.5 × 3 mm, 30 
axial slices). All data were analyzed using SPM5 
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(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5/). To account for T1 
relaxation effects each EPI sequence started with two dummy scans. First, 
all functional images were spatially realigned using rigid body 
transformation. After the realignment the images were slice time corrected 
using the first slice as a reference. The structural image of each subject was 
co-registered with their mean functional image. Further, all functional 
images were normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (Montreal, 
Quebec, Canada) T1 template. The images were resampled into 3.5 mm
3
 
voxels and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at 
half maximum). A high pass filter of 128 seconds was applied during fMRI 
data analysis. Statistical analyses were performed using the general linear 
model implemented in SPM5. We distinguished correct trials, human error 
trials, machine error trials and expectation trials. Because human errors are 
defined at the moment of the action (the moment the button is pressed in the 
coffee machine situation) and machine errors at the moment of the outcome 
(the moment the coffee is spilled in the coffee machine situation) we defined 
both moments as separate regressors in the GLM, resulting in 8 regressors (4 
conditions x 2 moments). When comparing different conditions in the whole 
brain contrasts, both moments (moment of the action and moment of the 
outcome) of one condition were always compared to both moments of the 
other condition. Both a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) 
and the first time derivative were modeled on these moments. We computed 
contrast images by comparing the parameter estimates for the regressors 
containing the canonical HRF. To account for residual movement effects, 
six regressors defining head movement were included in the model. A 
familywise error correction (FWE) was used with p < 0.05. All clusters 
containing more than 5 voxels were reported in the results section. First, we 
will describe three whole brain contrasts revealing activation related to 
human errors, machine errors and the occurrence of unexpected events 
respectively. Second, we performed a conjunction analysis on these three 
whole brain contrasts. This conjunction analysis reveals which brain areas 
are commonly activated by the three selected brain contrasts applying a 
FWE correction with a threshold of p < 0.05. Finally, we computed percent 
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signal-change analyses. These were carried out using the MARSBAR 
toolbox constructed for SPM5 (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002). 
Based on the conjunction analysis, we extracted a region of interest with the 
following peak coordinate (6 24 57). In this ROI, a sphere was drawn with a 
6-mm diameter around the peak coordinate. 
RESULTS 
We computed whole-brain contrasts to examine brain activation 
related to human errors, machine errors and the occurrence of unexpected 
events. To this aim, we subtracted brain activity in the correct condition 
from that in the human error condition, the machine error condition and the 
expectation condition respectively. The main focus of our analysis was the 
pMPFC (for a complete list of activations, see Table 1). As expected, brain 
activation related to human errors was found in the pMPFC. In particular, 
the activation was located in the presupplementary motor area (preSMA, 
BA8). Very similar pMPFC activation was registered after the subtraction of 
correct situations from machine error situations. As in the first contrast, the 
activation peak was located in the preSMA (BA8). Interestingly, the third 
contrast (subtracting correct situations from unexpected events) also 
revealed pMPFC activation. Here, the activation cluster was even more 
extended than in the previously described contrasts. More precisely, a region 
stretching from the supplementary motor area (SMA, BA 6), over the 
preSMA (BA 8) into the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ, BA 32) was revealed. 
The conclusions based on these results are twofold. First, the data suggest 
that the activation in the pMPFC is not specific for the observation of 
human errors. Second, the pMPFC activation is not uniquely related to the 
observations of errors but rather to the observation of a surprising or 
unexpected event. To further investigate this last matter, we performed a 
signal change analysis in the part of the pMPFC where the three previously 
described contrasts showed an overlap in activation. This overlap was 
defined by computing a conjunction analysis on all three contrasts (peak 
coordinate = 6 24 57, z = 4.98, extend = 6). If activation in the pMPFC is 
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related to violations in expectancy, we should find the largest percent signal 
change during the observation of machine errors and non-erroneous 
unexpected stimuli. Further, for human errors, the percent signal change 
should not be higher at the moment the human error is perceived compared 
to the moment of the human action, because the human error can already be 
expected based on the previously executed action. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA analysis with the factors CONDITION (correct, machine error, 
human error and expectation) and MOMENT (moment of the action and 
moment of the outcome) was conducted on the percent signal change in the 
overlapping region. The analysis revealed significant main effects of 
CONDITION (F(3,54) = 19.42, p < 0.001) and MOMENT (F(1,18) = 72.48, 
p < 0.001). Furthermore, the interaction between both factors reached 
significance, F(3,54) = 18.98, p < 0.001. Paired comparisons showed that 
for machine errors and the expectation condition, the percent signal change 
at the moment of the outcome was substantially larger than at the moment of 
the action (machine errors: F(1,18) = 58.50, p < 0.001; expectation: F(1,18) 
= 35.62, p < 0.001). Moreover, these signal changes were larger than the 
percent signal change at the moment of the outcome for human errors, 
F(1,18) = 86.88, p < 0.001. Further, there was no difference in the percent 
signal change related to human errors for both moments (F(1,18) = 2.09, p = 
0.17). Thus in line with what we hypothesized above, the percent signal 
change in the pMPFC coincides with the unexpectedness of the event (see 
Figure 1). More precisely, the events that are the most unexpected showed 
the largest percent signal change.  
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Figure 1. Results of the fMRI analyses. A, Sagittal view of pMPFC activity related to the 
contrast human errors – correct, MNI peak coordinate: 6 30 57. B, Sagittal view of pMPFC 
activity related to the contrast machine errors – correct, MNI peak coordinate: 6 24 57. C, 
Sagittal view of pMPFC acitivity related to the contrast expectation – correct, MNI peak 
coordinate: -3 18 48. D, Brain activity related to the conjunction analysis performed on the 
contrasts specified in A, B and C (A ∩ B ∩ C), MNI peak coordinate: 6 24 57. E, Percent 
signal changes for the area obtained in the conjunction analysis (MNI peak coordinate: 6 24 
57) for the correct, the human error, the machine error and the expectation condition at the 
moment of the action and the moment of the outcome.  
 
Finally, we wanted to investigate whether there were other brain 
regions that distinguish between the observation of human errors and the 
observation of machine errors. Therefore, we directly subtracted the brain 
activation related to the human error condition from the brain activation 
related to the machine error condition and vice versa. We found stronger 
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activation for human than machine errors in the right and left premotor 
cortex (rPM, lPM), superior parietal lobe (SPL), inferior parietal lobe (IPL), 
and activation in the left and right middle temporal gyrus (MTG). These 
latter clusters extended into the lateral occipitotemporal cortex and 
comprised the extrastriate body area (EBA) and the human MT+ complex 
(MT+) (Downing, Peelen, Wiggett, & Tew, 2006; Weiner & Grill-Spector, 
2011). For a complete list of activation related to the human error – machine 
error contrast see Table 1. On the other hand contrasting machine errors 
with human errors did not reveal any significant activation.   
Table 1. MNI Coordinates of Whole Brain Contrasts 
 Peak 
coordinates 
Z-score Cluster 
size 
Human error (human error – correct) 
             pMPFC (preSMA, BA8) 6 30 57 6.24 60 
             Inferior frontal gyrus  54 30 0 6.68 239 
             Inferior frontal gyrus  -60 18 15 5.45 53 
             Precentral gyrus (PM) 30 -9 57 4.85 7 
             Inferior parietal lobe  -42 -42 51 7.01 246 
             Inferior parietal lobe  60 -48 39 5.49 126 
             Inferior parietal lobe  -60 -51 36 5.10 36 
             Middle temporal gyrus   54 -66 6 6.18 267 
             Middle temporal gyrus  -57 -57 6 5.77 219 
Machine error (machine error – correct) 
             pMPFC (preSMA, BA 8) 6 24 57 5.51 26 
             Inferior frontal gyrus - anterior insula  54 21 9 5.93 126 
             Inferior frontal gyrus  -54 21 12 4.88 13 
             Anterior insula  -33 24 0 4.86 7 
             Middle temporal gyrus  -57 -57 6 5.28 46 
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Expectation (expectation – correct) 
             pMPFC (preSMA + RCZ) + SMA -3 18 48 6.27 428 
             Inferior frontal gyrus - anterior insula -51 15 -3 5.98 150 
             Inferior frontal gyrus - anterior insula 45 18 3 5.66 142 
             Inferior frontal sulcus -45 6 39 5.89 136 
             Middle frontal gyrus -39 57 12 5.31 36 
             Middle frontal gyrus 27 63 24 4.93 21 
             Inferior parietal lobe  -33 -60 51 6.04 289 
             Inferior parietal lobe  33 -60 51 5.16 38 
             Precuneus 18 -78 48 4.73 5 
             Fusiform gyrus 33 -51 -12 6.08 66 
             Middle temporal gyrus -60 -54 15 5.77 70 
             Middle occipital gyrus 39 -84 15 5.17 50 
             Middle occipital gyrus -33 -90 9 5.14 19 
Human versus Machine (human error-machine error) 
             Precentral gyrus (PM) 24 -6 57 5.50 55 
             Precentral gyrus (PM) -21 -9 60 5.63 49 
             Inferior parietal lobe  -36 -36 45 6.21 211 
             Superior parietal lobe 15 -54 66 5.35 26 
             Middle temporal gyrus 54 -69 9 5.21 40 
             Middle temporal gyrus -42 -75 9 6.82 160 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The pMPFC has been primarily known as a region involved in 
performance monitoring. More precisely, numerous studies have related 
pMPFC activity to the occurrence of conflict, the commission of own errors 
and decision uncertainty (for reviews see Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004; 
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). However, recent studies have shown consistent 
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pMPFC activation related to error observation as well (de Bruijn et al., 
2009; Manthey et al., 2003; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009; Shane et al., 
2008). As such, the execution and observation of errors seem to activate the 
same brain circuits. Similarly, in the domain of action understanding shared 
brain mechanisms for observation and execution have been well 
documented. Consequently, it has been hypothesized that we understand 
each other’s actions by means of internal motor simulation (Iacoboni, 
Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 2005; Rizzolatti 
& Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). Because error 
execution and error observation also rely on a similar brain structure, it is 
tempting to suggest that error observation and error execution also rely on 
this simulation hypothesis. Namely, by simulating each other’s behaviour 
we can recognize each other’s errors and anticipate them. In this study we 
tested whether errors that cannot be simulated (machine errors) also evoke 
pMPFC activity. In other words, is pMPFC activation in error observation 
directly linked to simulation or not? Our data clearly show that both error 
types (human errors and machine errors) evoke pMPFC activity. In sum, 
pMPFC activation does not distinguish between the observation of human 
and machine errors. This highlights the general and non-social nature of the 
cognitive system that is responsible for the processing of errors.  
Since both erroneous and non-erroneous unexpected events (i.e., 
machine errors and expectation condition) elicit pMPFC activation, our data 
suggest a more general role for the pMPFC. That is, pMPFC activation is 
related to a violation of expectancies of the observed events. The dominant 
views on pMPFC functioning posit that it signals response conflict 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), predicts error likelihood 
(Brown & Braver, 2005), or signals an outcome that is worse than expected 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Recently however, a unitary account reconciling 
these views has been proposed (Alexander & Brown, 2010), relating the 
pMPFC to learning and to the prediction of outcomes of actions. In this 
view, both the non-occurrence of a predicted outcome and the occurrence of 
an unpredicted outcome (as is the case in the machine error condition and 
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the expectancy condition) should evoke pMPFC activity (see also the 
orienting account, Notebaert, Houtman, Van Opstal, Gevers, Fias, & 
Verguts, 2009; Núñez Castellar, Kuhn, Fias, & Notebaert, 2010). 
Interestingly, our data pattern fits nicely with the predictions of this new 
account. The fact that the machine error condition and the expectation 
condition represent unexpected events is further supported by the anterior 
insular activity in these conditions (See Table 1). It has been argued that the 
insular activity can be seen as an orienting response (i.e., an arousal 
response to salient events) towards an error or unexpected event (Ullsperger, 
Harsay, Wessel, & Ridderinkhof, 2010).  
Our data show that pMPFC activation is not uniquely related to the 
observation of errors that can be simulated. However, there might be other 
brain regions that distinguish between the observation of human errors and 
machine errors. To address this question, we directly compared brain 
activity related to human errors with brain activity related to machine errors. 
Note that the only difference between these conditions is the accuracy of the 
human action, (i.e., in the human error condition an incorrect action is 
performed whereas in the machine error condition the correct action is 
performed). First, subtracting human error activity from machine error 
activity did not reveal any significant brain activation. We can thus conclude 
that there are no specific brain regions involved in the processing of 
machine errors compared to human errors. However, when substracting 
machine errors from human errors, we found activation in the lateral 
occipitotemporal cortex (LOTC) including EBA and the human MT+ 
complex. These regions have been found to correlate with body-related 
visual perception (Downing et al., 2006; Weiner et al., 2011). In addition, 
the PMC and more specifically the frontal eye fields (FEF) were active. 
Also these areas are involved in visual processing or visual attention 
(Donner, Kettermann, Diesch, Ostendorf, Villringer, & Brandt, 2002; 
Muggleton, Kalla, Juan, & Walsh, 2011). Finally, besides these lower level 
areas of visual processing we also found two sites of activation in the 
parietal lobe (SPL and IPL). The SPL has been shown to be involved in 
130     CHAPTER 5 
body transformation processes and in action observation (Bonda, Petrides, 
Frey, & Evans, 1995; Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & 
Haggard, 2005; Urgesi, Calvo-Merino, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2007). Further, 
the IPL has been well documented in the area of action observation and has 
been linked to the mirror system (for a review see Cattaneo & Rizzolatti, 
2009). In sum, the observation of an incorrect action seems to trigger 
regions related to the observations of human actions in a stronger way than 
the observation of correct actions. 
Overall, it seems that pMPFC activity is not uniquely related to the 
observation of human errors but rather to the occurrence of unexpected 
events. Further, there are specific brain regions involved in the processing of 
human errors compared to machine errors. In general, we found areas related 
to visual processing (such as LOTC and FEF) and areas related to higher 
levels of visual processing (i.e., areas involved in action observation such as 
the IPL and SPL). These latter results suggest that the observation of an 
incorrect action stronger activate the brain mechanisms needed for 
understanding the action than the observation of correct actions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In daily life we constantly adjust our behaviour according to the 
flexible demands of the environment. Situations of conflict and errors form 
key aspects for these behavioural adjustments. Moreover, a situation of 
conflict or an error signals that the current behaviour is no longer 
appropriate and that adjustments are needed. Over the past decades an 
innumerable amount of studies on error and conflict monitoring have 
emerged. However, this current research has approached errors and conflict 
from a narrow point of view. In my opinion, three different aspects of error 
and conflict processing should be addressed to broaden the perspective on 
this research. First of all, the classical literature has focused on errors and 
conflict at one specific level, namely the response level. Therefore, 
conclusions obtained via this research might not hold at different levels. We 
investigated this question in chapter two and three by extending research on 
errors and conflict to another level, namely the task level. Second, even 
when only considering research on the response level, the paradigms used in 
the field are very restricted. Moreover, in typical conflict tasks the fact that 
we can learn from our errors is neglected, typically, because there is not 
much to learn in these tasks. Since it is widely known that people learn from 
their errors, one can wonder if the results obtained in these simple tasks are 
indicative for our daily life behaviour. We answered this question in chapter 
four by studying behavioural correlates of error and conflict processing in a 
task where learning is possible, namely mental arithmetic. Third, over the 
last decade it has been found that the brain region involved in error 
execution is also active when observing errors. As a result, it has been 
suggested that we understand each other’s errors by means of internal 
simulation (e.g., Bates, Patel, & Liddle, 2005; Bekkering, de Bruijn, 
Cuijpers, Newman-Norlund, van Schie, & Meulenbroek, 2009; van Schie, 
Mars, Coles, & Bekkering, 2004). However until now, only the observation 
of human errors has been investigated. In chapter five we extended the 
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research on error observation by investigating if other sorts of errors, 
namely errors caused by machines, also activate this particular brain region. 
In the current and last chapter of this thesis, I will provide an overview of 
the empirical results obtained in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 and will integrate 
these findings in light of the existing literature.  
PREPARING OR EXECUTING THE WRONG TASK: THE INFLUENCE ON 
SWITCH EFFECTS 
The goal of the second chapter was to establish a design in which 
we could disentangle task and response errors. Behavioural studies on task 
and response errors have been conducted before (Steinhauser & Hübner, 
2006; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2008). However, in these paradigms, bivalent 
stimulus-response mappings were used. As a result, the different error types 
could not be disentangled univocally. For example, when performing a 
magnitude and a parity task and the responses ‘odd’ and ‘< 5’ are mapped 
onto one effector, task errors and correct responses cannot be distinguished 
for stimuli that are smaller than 5 and odd or for stimuli that are larger than 
5 and even. Under the same condition, task errors cannot be distinguished 
from response errors for stimuli that are smaller than 5 and even or for 
stimuli that are larger than 5 and odd. To address this issue we used 
univalent stimulus-response mappings as in Meiran and Daichman (2005). 
In contrast to bivalent mappings, this allows one to infer from the subjects’ 
responses which error was made. In our design, the responses were divided 
over the index and the middle finger of the left and right hand. An error 
performed with the correct hand signified a response error, while an error 
performed with the wrong hand was classified as a task error or as a 
combination of a task and a response error (dependent on which finger was 
used). Further, we included two manipulations to increase the rate of 
response and task errors, respectively. To increase the response error rate, 
we presented flanker stimuli at both sides of the target.  Response times 
were shorter on congruent flanker trials than on incongruent flanker trials. 
However, response errors were not affected by the congruency of the 
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flankers. Despite the absence of a relation between response errors and 
flankers, overall we did obtain a sufficient response error rate (10%). Task 
error rate was effectively increased by the within switch manipulation. More 
precisely, if we inserted a switch cue after the occurrence of the stimulus 
more task errors were made than when participants did not had to switch 
tasks within the trial. Interestingly, we could replicate the behavioural 
findings obtained earlier for task and response errors. That is, Steinhauser 
and Hübner (2006) observed switch benefits instead of switch costs after 
task errors. They explained this effect by stating that response execution will 
strengthen the current task activations. In other words, when a task error is 
made the wrong task is strengthened, leading to a benefit on a subsequent 
task switch (since the previously strengthened task is presented again). 
Although we replicated this effect on the overall level, the effect 
disappeared after task errors made on within switch trials. At first this 
finding seems puzzling since one would expect to find the most robust effect 
in the condition where most task errors occurred (i.e., in the within switch 
condition). Since the within switch trials encompassed two task indications 
(one indicated by the first cue and one indicated by the secondary switch 
cue) we argued that both task indications might have influenced switch 
effects on the next trial, one leading to switch costs (indicated by the first 
cue) and one leading to switch benefits (indicated by the secondary cue). 
Hence, switch benefits after within switch trials might have been cancelled 
out. In a further experiment this prediction was confirmed. We showed 
reduced switch costs when on the previous trial two tasks were prepared. In 
sum, not only the executed task but also the task that was only prepared 
influences further switch effects. This is an important finding since most 
task switching studies have focused exclusively on the role of the executed 
task on subsequent switch costs (e.g., Philipp, Jolicoeur, Falkenstein, & 
Koch, 2007; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2006). We show here, that it is not necessary to execute a 
task to influence further behaviour.   
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ERRORS AND CONFLICT AT THE TASK LEVEL AND THE 
RESPONSE LEVEL 
In chapter three we used the experimental design of chapter two to 
study neural correlates associated with task errors and task conflict in order 
to compare them with the neural correlates of response errors and response 
conflict. Since the flanker manipulation used in chapter two did not 
influence the response error rate, we decided to use another manipulation to 
increase response errors. In line with the within switch manipulation for task 
errors we inserted a response switch manipulation. Three trial types were 
thus implemented, no switches, a switch to the different task or a switch to 
the different response. The results indicated that task errors were effectively 
increased by the task switch cue and the response errors by the response 
switch cue.  
AN ANATOMICAL SUBLOCALIZATION OF THE PMPFC 
The neural results indicate that different subregions of the pMPFC 
are correlated with task errors, task conflict, response errors and response 
conflict. An overview of the different activations in relation to the pMPFC 
can be found in Figure 1.  
As is apparent from the figure, the region activated by response 
conflict (in BA 8) was in line with regions earlier reported in the literature 
(for a review see Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Niewenhuis, 2004). 
Response errors were associated with activation in BA 8 - BA 9. Although 
this activation is more dorsal and anterior than the activity usually reported, 
the distinction between response conflict and response errors resembles 
earlier findings. That is, response conflict activates more dorsal and 
posterior regions than response errors (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger 
& von Cramon, 2004). Task conflict activated more posterior regions 
(preSMA) as already found in previous studies (Brass & von Cramon, 2002; 
Crone, Wendelken, Donohue, & Bunge, 2006; Rushworth, Hadland, Paus, & 
Sipila, 2002). Interestingly, we also obtained neural correlates for task 
142     CHAPTER 6 
errors, which have never been investigated before. As can be seen from 
Figure 1, task errors tend to activate a subregion of the pMPFC that is 
located anterior to the preSMA and more dorsal to the RCZ, which we 
labeled the dorsal frontomedian cortex (dFMC).  
 
 
Figure 1. Midsaggital view of the pMPFC bordered by the VCA line and the AC-PC line. 
Two subregions of the pMPFC are indicated; preSMA is presented in green, RCZ is presented 
in blue. Brodmann areas are indicated with their corresponding number. Peak coordinates in 
the pMPFC related to task errors (TE), task conflict (TC), response errors (RE) and response 
conflict (RC) are indicated by blue squares. Further, activation related to response errors in 
the preSMA is indicated by a green square. Finally, observation of errors and unexpected 
events is indicated by an orange square. 
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Although the pattern of results seems to indicate dorsal-ventral and anterior-
posterior distinctions in the pMPFC, there is one activation that does not fit 
our interpretation. Moreover, we also obtained a dorsal component, in the 
preSMA, related to response errors (indicated by a green square in Figure 
1). This might be related to the fact that response errors were elicited by a 
switch manipulation. Activation related to response errors might thus reflect 
a switch process (reflected by the preSMA activity) and an error related 
process (reflected by the ventral activity in the pMPFC). 
There are some studies that already addressed different 
sublocalizations in the pMPFC. However these studies are primarily 
restricted to conflict research. For example, some studies have shown 
distinctions between forms of pre-response conflict and response conflict. It 
seems that pre-response conflict is associated with more dorsal and posterior 
parts of the pMPFC than response conflict (Kim, Kroger, & Kim, 2011). 
Others have shown an anterior to posterior typology ranging from strategy 
control over decision control towards response control (Venkatraman, 
Rosati, Taren, & Huettel, 2009). Also, decision conflict without response 
conflict seems to activate regions in the pMPFC more dorsal than those 
usually found for response conflict (Pochon, Riis, Sanfey, Nystrom, & 
Cohen, 2008). More related to our distinction of task and response conflict, 
Orr and Weissman (2009) presented a cue and a target in two modalities at 
the same time (visual and auditory modality). At cue level, the visual 
modality informed participants to which feature of the target (look or hear) 
they should react. The target comprised a spoken and a visually presented 
‘x’ or ‘o’. The authors found that conflict between the visual and the 
auditory information at a cue level (which represents a conflict between 
tasks) activated dorsal parts of the pMPFC while conflict at a target level 
(which represents conflict at the response level) activated ventral parts of 
the pMPFC. While different levels of conflict (see also Egner, 2008) and 
their corresponding brain areas have been discussed in the literature, 
different levels of error processing have been widely neglected. Previously, 
Krigolson and Holroyd (2007) reported a dissociation between high and low 
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level errors. They manipulated these two levels of error processing in a 
movement tracking task. Participants were required to move a cursor from a 
start point to a target point by manipulating a joystick. However, the target 
point sometimes changed to a different location, resulting in low level 
errors. In some cases, participants could not move the cursor making it 
impossible to achieve the movement goal. These cases were labeled as high- 
level errors. The authors showed by means of ERP measurements that the 
frontal brain system is related to high-level errors while the posterior system 
is correlated with low level errors. Another interesting study, more related to 
our distinction of task and response errors, is the study of Nee, Kastner and 
Brown (2011). These authors contrasted effects of response conflict, 
response errors and task switching to investigate sublocalizations in the 
pMPFC. Interestingly their manipulation of task switches can be seen as a 
task error manipulation. More precisely, on each trial a face and a body part 
was presented. Body and face parts could be human or monkey. During the 
face task the species of the face should be classified and likewise for the 
body task. Response conflict was thus induced by the species congruence of 
the irrelevant feature. The task that had to be executed was only indirectly 
indicated by feedback. More precisely, the authors presented runs of the 
same task of 5-15 trials. When a task switch had to be made, participants 
received negative feedback. In other words, task switch trials were 
characterized by a wrong task performance or a task error. Although activity 
for response errors, response conflict and task switches (or task errors) 
overlapped largely, the cluster found for task switches extended more 
dorsally and posterior in the pMPFC than for response conflict. Further 
replicating our results, activity for response errors extended more ventral 
and anterior in the pMPFC than activity for task switches. In contrast to 
what we found, task switches (or task errors), did not show differential 
activation compared to response errors. However, one should bear in mind 
that task errors in the study of Nee et al. (2011) might primarily reflect an 
orienting response, since the error could only be deduced from negative 
feedback. Apart from these studies and our own experiment in chapter 3, 
there seems to be no research concerning the sublocalization of errors in the 
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brain. However, the task error region that we described in the pMPFC, 
namely the dFMC, has been described before in higher level decision 
processes (Elliott & Dolan, 1998; Goel & Dolan, 2000; Rushworth et al., 
2002; Volz, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003; Volz, Schubotz, & von 
Cramon, 2004). Based on these findings, and keeping in mind the different 
connections of the pMPFC to motor output, we argue that more abstract 
errors are processed in more dorsal regions of the pMPFC.  
ERROR ADAPTATION IN MENTAL ARITHMETIC 
POST-ERROR SLOWING AND POST-ERROR ACCURACY INCREASE 
In chapter four we tested whether the same behavioural effects 
observed in typical laboratory or simple mapping tasks would also be 
observed in a more daily used task such as mental arithmetic. As we already 
stated in the introducing chapter, classical accounts of error monitoring posit 
that people will shift their point on the speed-accuracy trade off after 
encountered with an error. That is, they will become slower but more 
accurate. Although post-error slowing is a very robust effect, it does not 
always coincide with accuracy increases. This forms a problem for classical 
theories of error monitoring and questions the adaptive nature of post-error 
slowing. Recent studies have showed that post-error slowing is not restricted 
to the occurrence of an error but rather to the occurrence of an unexpected 
event. Indeed, post-correct slowing is observed when errors are more 
frequent than correct responses. Likewise, slowing is observed after oddball 
events (Notebaert, Houtman, Van Opstal, Gevers, Fias, & Verguts, 2009). 
These findings indicate that the occurrence of an error or an unexpected 
event captures attention and slows down subsequent task processing. This 
explanation of post-error slowing fits nicely with the behavioural results of 
the study by Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009). These authors showed that after 
an error central resources are occupied for a certain period of time. 
Moreover, the authors observed an underadditive effect of perceptual 
difficulty and post-error slowing. That is, while perceptual difficulty led to 
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worse performance after correct trials, this performance difference was 
absent after error trials. This underadditivity was explained by the fact that 
the perceptual discrimination process could be carried out in parallel to the 
error monitoring process. Hence, after errors the difference between easy 
and difficult perceptual discriminations was absorbed into this waiting 
period (under the assumption that perceptual processes can be carried out in 
parallel to central processes). Although the authors refer to this time period 
as an error monitoring process during which accuracy of the response is 
monitored, their data could also be explained by an orienting account. 
Moreover, after an error there is a certain time period not available for 
further task processing due to an orientation process. Interestingly, this 
hypothesis could be tested by investigating the underadditive effect found by 
Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009), after other infrequent events such as 
oddballs, or infrequent correct responses. If the monitoring process is 
specific to the monitoring of the error, one should only find the 
underadditivity effect after errors. If, on the other hand, the monitoring 
process is a more general orientation process one should observe the effect 
after all sorts of infrequent events.  
There is thus converging evidence that post-error slowing might not 
be related to adaptive processes but might rather reflect an attentional 
process. This would explain why post-error slowing is not always 
accompanied by performance improvements. More specifically, post-error 
slowing is an attentional effect and post-error accuracy increase is an 
adaptive effect. However, this does not answer the question why 
performance improvements are not always observed after errors. One would 
think that people tend to learn from earlier mistakes and thus improve their 
performance. In chapter four we showed that one of the reasons for the 
absence of post-error accuracy increases might be that most error monitoring 
tasks are very restricted in the behavioural adaptations they allow. 
Consequently, post-error adaptations might not be revealed in these tasks. 
When we used a task that allowed a more rich set of behavioural adaptations 
we succeeded to find post-error accuracy increases. This finding shows that 
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it is important to use a wide range of experimental paradigms when studying 
post-error effects. Of course, the question remains why previous studies, 
using the same restricted set of experimental paradigms, sometimes 
observed post-error accuracy increases while other’s did not. An important 
factor that has been largely neglected in this research and that can account 
for the differences between studies are individual differences. In a very 
recent study, Moser and colleagues (2011) showed that beliefs about 
learning or intelligence have an impact on the way we monitor our errors. 
More specifically, they showed that while these beliefs did not interact with 
post-error slowing, this was the case for post-error accuracy increases. 
Moreover, post-error accuracy increases were positively correlated with how 
strong people believed intelligence is malleable and can be developed 
through learning (Moser, Schroder, Heeter, Moran, & Lee, 2011). In sum, 
testing behavioural correlates of post-error behaviour with a wider range of 
paradigms and taking into account individual differences can shed more 
light on the adaptive nature of these correlates.  
CONFLICT ADAPTATION   
Further, we found no evidence for conflict adaptation in mental 
arithmetic. This is in line with what we predicted and can be explained by a 
general ‘adaptation by binding’ account (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). 
According to this account, situations of conflict lead to arousal which will 
strengthen the active task representations. This account combines earlier 
discrepant theories concerning the conflict adaptation effect described in 
chapter one. Moreover, it has been questioned if the conflict adaptation 
effect was a cognitive control effect or merely the result of feature binding 
processes. The ‘adaptation by binding’ account reconciles these views by 
postulating cognitive control as a combination of arousal and binding 
processes. As regards our data, the account predicts that strengthening a 
certain multiplication due to conflict (e.g., 4 x 6 = 30) will not lead to 
improved performance on a different multiplication trial (e.g., 7 x 8 = 49), 
explaining the absence of conflict adaptation. 
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THE ROLE OF THE MEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX IN ERROR 
OBSERVATION   
SALIENCY OF EVENTS 
Finally in chapter five we studied neural correlates associated with 
error observation. We found that the pMPFC did not distinguish between 
errors induced by humans or errors induced by machines. We even found the 
most extensive area of activation in the pMPFC when observing an 
unexpected event. From the error execution domain there is now converging 
evidence that the role of the pMPFC is not solely dedicated to error 
processing but might rather comprise a more general role. For example in 
the study of Braver and colleagues (2001) pMPFC activation was found 
under different situations of low frequency behaviour. More precisely, 
pMPFC activation was found during low frequency events across three 
different tasks, namely response inhibition, target detection and response 
selection (Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001). Likewise Jessup, 
Busemeyer and Brown (2010) showed in a gambling task that the pMPFC 
only responded to losses when these were infrequent. When losses were 
more likely than wins, the pMPFC effect reversed. That is, pMPFC 
responded to wins instead of losses. Oliveira, McDonald and Goodman 
(2007), showed that the FRN (feedback related negativity), an ERP correlate 
associated with pMPFC activation, was not related to the valence of the 
feedback but rather to the violation of expectancy. Moreover, the FRN could 
be induced by positive feedback when this was unexpected. Analogue, when 
negative feedback was expected no FRN was observed. In line with these 
results, in chapter five we observed pMPFC activity related to deviations of 
expectancy. That is when observing an unexpected behaviour such as an 
error the pMPFC was activated. However, when observing a non-erroneous 
unexpected event (i.e., an unrelated stimulus appearing on the screen), the 
most extensive pMPFC activity was revealed. Although one should bear in 
mind that our study comprises an error observation study and not an error 
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execution study, our data underline the role of pMPFC in detecting salient 
events rather than errors per se.  
The attribution of this broader role to the pMPFC does not fit with 
the computational models described in the introduction. First, the role of the 
pMPFC is not restricted to a detector of conflict, arguing against the conflict 
monitoring account (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). 
Second, although the outcomes are not expected they are not necessarily 
worse than expected. Indeed, as described above also positive expectations 
lead to pMPFC activation (Jessup et al., 2010). Hence, the learning 
reinforcement theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) does not capture this more 
general role of the pMPFC. In the same line, the error prediction model 
(Brown & Braver, 2005) does not explain why pMPFC is activated by 
positive outcomes. Recently, a new computational model was suggested that 
can account for the data obtained in this thesis and from the studies 
described above. According to this account the pMPFC learns to predict 
possible outcomes of an action and signals discrepancies between actual and 
expected outcomes (Alexander & Brown, 2010). The pMPFC thus responds 
to negative but also to positive unexpected events. 
AN ANATOMICAL SUBLOCALIZATION OF THE PMPFC 
The region in the pMPFC that we found to correlate with error 
observation is more dorsally located than the region normally described in 
error execution studies. Indeed, when comparing the coordinates obtained in 
chapter five with the meta-analysis of Ridderinkhof and colleagues (2004), 
our peak coordinates are more dorsally located than those obtained for error 
execution studies, more precisely in the preSMA, see Figure 1. Since the 
observation of errors will not automatically activate the correct response, 
this fits well with what we postulated in the discussion of chapter three. 
Moreover, errors that are directly related to a motor response will activate 
more ventrally located subparts of the pMPFC, while more abstract errors 
such as task errors or observed errors will activated more dorsal parts of the 
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pMPFC. In light of this latter argument it would be very interesting to 
investigate brain activity related to observed errors that evoke a response 
from the observer. In daily life one can think of numerous examples where 
we directly act upon the errors of others. For example when someone 
stumbles while holding an expensive vase, we will probably try to catch the 
vase. 
SPECIFIC BRAIN REGIONS ASSOCIATED WITH OBSERVING HUMAN 
ERRORS   
Outside the pMPFC, the observation of human errors activated a 
unique activation pattern compared to machine errors. More precisely, areas 
involved in visual processing and action understanding such as the inferior 
parietal lobe (IPL) and the lateral occipitotemporal cortex (LOTC) were 
only activated when observing human errors. When contrasting machine 
errors with human errors no unique activation was revealed. This reflects 
that the observation of human errors causes strengthened activation in 
regions related to the visual processing of body related characteristics. 
A BROADER PERSPECTIVE 
To study our complex cognitive abilities, experimental 
psychologists try to reconstruct daily life situations in the laboratory by 
means of simple computer tasks. When results are replicated over these 
laboratory tasks, it is considered legitimate to extrapolate laboratory 
findings to our daily life cognitive abilities. The standard procedure to study 
error and conflict processing in the laboratory comprises simple computer 
tasks where conflict at a response level is induced. At a neural level, the 
pMPFC, and in particular the RCZ, is considered the core region of error 
and conflict processing (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von 
Cramon, 2004). In addition, the pMPFC is activated when we observe other 
humans making errors. At a behavioural level, post-error slowing and 
conflict adaptation are considered robust effects, revealing adaptation after 
conflict or errors (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; but see also Notebaert et al., 
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2009). However, in this thesis I demonstrate that always using the same 
restricted set of paradigms might have biased these conclusions and thus 
might have biased our knowledge about human error and conflict 
processing.  
First of all, when studying neural correlates of error processing at a 
different level than the commonly studied response level, different neuro-
anatomical regions are revealed. More precisely, we demonstrated that more 
abstract events are related to more dorsal parts of the pMPFC, while events 
that are more related to a motor response will activate more ventral parts of 
the pMPFC. Recent work confirms that the pMPFC is indeed related to 
subsequent adjustments in behaviour. Moreover, it was shown that pMPFC 
activity predicted signal increases in perceptual areas encoding task relevant 
features and signal decreases in perceptual areas encoding task irrelevant 
features (Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 
2011). One interesting topic for future research is to see if dissociable 
adaptation processes are triggered by different subparts of the pMPFC. 
More specifically, in accordance with what we hypothesized the subregion 
in the pMPFC related to task errors might trigger brain areas related to 
general task processing as found in task switching literature (e.g., Brass & 
von Cramon, 2002; Crone et al., 2006; Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, 
& von Cramon, 2000; Hyafil, Summerfield, & Koechlin, 2009; Ruge, Brass, 
Koch, Rubin, Meiran, & von Cramon, 2005; Rushworth et al., 2002) while 
the subregion in the pMPFC related to response errors might trigger 
perceptual brain areas as shown before (Danielmeier et al.,2011; King, 
Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010).  
Second, due to the over-simplification of tasks on error processing, 
one of the key features of error processing (i.e., learning from errors) might 
not be revealed. In other words, if there is nothing to learn, one cannot 
measure correlates of learning. Indeed, when using a task where learning is 
possible, namely mental arithmetic, different behavioural effects were found 
than in the typically used paradigms.  
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Third, we showed that the region previously believed to be 
dedicated to the processing of human errors is also active when observing 
machine errors. In addition, we demonstrated that the pMPFC is active when 
observing salient events, erroneous or not. This latter finding contradicts the 
simulation account and illustrates again that it is important to approach 
errors from a broader perspective.  
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I aimed to widen the current perspective on error and 
conflict processing. The conclusions of this thesis are threefold. First of all, 
we demonstrated that pMPFC does not entail a unitary function. Moreover, 
we showed that errors and conflict at response and task levels can be 
dissociated in the pMPFC. Further, we demonstrated that behavioural 
effects that have been extensively described and have served as evidence for 
human adaptive control, might be restricted to a specific class of 
experimental paradigms. Finally, we showed that pMPFC is not solely 
related to the observation of errors, but also to the observation of 
unexpected events. In sum, we show that adaptive control should be 
investigated at different levels in a wider range of experimental tasks and 
that error observation research should not exclusively focus on human 
errors.     
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INLEIDING 
Eén van de meest kenmerkende menselijke eigenschappen is onze 
imperfectie, of het feit dat we af en toe fouten maken. Meestal hebben deze 
fouten geen verdragende consequenties en halen we er zelfs informatie uit 
om ons gedrag te verbeteren. Met andere woorden, foutgerelateerde 
gedragingen vormen een belangrijk onderdeel van menselijk adaptief 
gedrag. Het is dan ook niet verwonderlijk dat foutverwerking een uitvoerig 
bestudeerd domein in de cognitieve psychologie omvat (voor een overzicht 
zie Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Ullsperger & 
von Cramon, 2004). In het laboratorium gebruikt men simpele conflict taken 
om fouten uit te lokken. Typisch in deze taken is dat participanten een  
respons uitvoeren terwijl irrelevante informatie met deze respons 
interfereert. In de flanker taak (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) bijvoorbeeld moet 
de richting van een centrale pijl aangegeven worden, terwijl deze pijl 
geflankeerd wordt door twee andere pijlen. In een conflict situatie zullen 
deze flankerende pijlen in een andere richting wijzen dan de centrale pijl en 
dus de verkeerde respons activeren. Door deze situatie van conflict zullen 
meer respons fouten gegenereerd worden dan in een niet-conflicterende 
situatie. Respons fouten en respons conflict komen dus heel vaak samen 
voor.   
Hoewel de literatuur naar fouten en conflict heel uitgebreid is, zijn 
fouten en conflict vanuit een enkelvoudig standpunt bekeken. Ten eerste 
heeft fout onderzoek tot hier toe voornamelijk gefocust op één niveau, 
namelijk fouten op een respons niveau. Verder heeft huidig onderzoek 
voornamelijk gebruik gemaakt van eenvoudige taken die niet altijd 
weergeven wat er in de werkelijkheid gebeurt. Ten slotte, zijn de neurale 
correlaten van foutobservatie enkel onderzocht tijdens het observeren van 
menselijke fouten. In deze doctoraatsthesis zal ik fouten en conflict uit een 
bredere invalshoek benaderen. Daartoe zal ik achtereenvolgens de drie 
voorvermelde punten behandelen. Ten eerste zullen we onderzoeken of 
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fouten en conflict op het taak niveau dezelfde hersen gebieden activeren als 
fouten en conflict op een respons niveau. Ten tweede zullen we kijken of 
dezelfde gedragseffecten die gevonden worden in experimentele taken ook 
teruggevonden worden in taken die complexer zijn en aldus meer 
overeenkomen met de werkelijkheid. Ten slotte zullen we onderzoeken of 
het neuraal systeem dat verantwoordelijk is voor het observeren van fouten, 
enkel actief is bij de observatie van een menselijke fout of ook reageert op 
fouten gemaakt door machines.  
EERDERE BEVINDINGEN 
GEDRAGSEFFECTEN 
Op gedragsniveau zijn een aantal robuuste effecten gevonden na het 
maken van een fout of na het optreden van conflict. Ten eerste is er 
geobserveerd dat participanten trager zijn na een fout dan na een correct 
antwoord (e.g., Laming, 1968; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). Deze vertraging 
werd aanzien als evidentie voor een aanpassing in controle na een fout, of 
anders gezegd als een adaptief effect. Na een fout zullen proefpersonen 
namelijk vertragen om zo minder fouten te maken op volgende proefbeurten. 
Hoewel proefpersonen vertragen na een fout, is een verbetering in 
performantie na een fout niet altijd terug gevonden (e.g., Hajcak, McDonald, 
& Simons, 2003; Hajcak & Simons, 2008; King, Korb, von Cramon, & 
Ullsperger, 2010). Dit stelt het feit dat de vertraging na een fout een adaptief 
effect is in vraag. Recent is er dan ook gesuggereerd dat de vertraging na een 
fout een aandachtseffect in plaats van een adaptief effect is (Notebaert, 
Houtman, Van Opstal, Gevers, Fias, & Verguts, 2009; Núñez Castellar, 
Kuhn, Fias, & Notebaert, 2010). Volgens deze visie is de vertraging na een 
fout niet gerelateerd aan de fout op zich, maar eerder aan het feit dat een 
fout een onverwachte gebeurtenis is. Deze onverwachte gebeurtenis trekt de 
aandacht weg van de taak die moet uitgevoerd worden en zorgt op die 
manier voor een vertraging (Notebaert et al., 2009).   
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Op het vlak van conflict verwerking is er een vermindering in 
interferentie gevonden na een conflict trial dan na een niet-conflict trial. Dit 
effect werd voor het eerst beschreven door Gratton en collega’s in de flanker 
taak en wordt geïnterpreteerd als een cognitief controle effect (Gratton, 
Coles, & Donchin, 1992). Een conflict trial zal namelijk meer controle 
vragen en daardoor zullen op volgende trials de interferentie effecten 
verkleinen. Of dit effect nu werkelijk een marker is van cognitieve controle 
of eerder een bij-effect van stimulus-respons repetities is fel gedebatteerd 
(Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003; Nieuwenhuis, 
Stins, Posthuma, Polderman, Boomsma, & de Geus, 2006). Recent zijn deze 
twee visies bijeengebracht in de ‘adaptatie door binding’ theorie (Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2009). Volgens deze theorie is cognitieve controle een 
combinatie van arousal en binding processen. Een situatie van conflict zal 
resulteren in een toestand van verhoogde arousal en veroorzaakt op die 
manier een versterking van de geactiveerde taak representaties.  
FUNCTIONELE NEURO-ANATOMIE VAN FOUTEN EN CONFLICT 
Het meest beschreven hersen gebied in fout en conflict literatuur is 
gelokaliseerd in het posterieure en mediale gedeelte van de prefrontale 
cortex, verder de posterieure mediale prefrontale cortex genoemd (pMPFC). 
Dit gebied breidt zich dorsaal uit vanaf de AC-PC lijn, een lijn die de 
anterieure met de posterieure commissuur verbindt. De posterieure grens 
wordt bepaald door de VCA lijn, een verticale lijn die door de anterieure 
commissuur gaat en loodrecht staat op de AC-PC lijn. De Brodmann arealen 
(BA) die geassocieerd worden met de pMPFC zijn BA 6, BA 8, BA 9, BA 
32 en BA 24, zie Figuur 1. De posterieure grens van de pMPFC kan 
eveneens aangeduid worden door een subregio van de pMPFC, namelijk de 
presupplementarische motor area (preSMA). Hoewel hersen activatie 
geassocieerd met respons fouten en respons conflict wijd verspreid is over 
de pMPFC, is de kern van activatie te vinden in de rostrale cingulate zone 
(RCZ) (voor een overzicht zie Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von 
Cramon, 2004). Volgens Picard en Strick (1996) strekt de RCZ zich 
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anterieur uit vanaf de VCA lijn en beslaat het gebied voornamelijk BA 32. 
Hoewel het gebied ventraal tot in BA 24 en dorsaal tot in BA 8 en BA 6 
reikt. Voor een overzicht van de anatomische labels zie Figuur1.  
Of er een anatomische dissociatie bestaat in de pMPFC tussen 
fouten en conflict is nog steeds een open vraag. Sommige studies hebben 
aangetoond dat de RCZ geactiveerd wordt door zowel fouten als conflict 
(Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 1998; Kerns, Cohen,  
MacDonald, Cho, Stenger, & Carter, 2004). Andere hebben een distinctie in 
de pMPFC gevonden tussen fouten en conflict. Deze laatste studies vonden 
dat meer ventrale gebieden gerelateerd zijn aan respons fouten en meer 
dorsale gebieden gerelateerd zijn aan respons conflict (Braver, Barch, Gray, 
Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Kiehl, Liddle, & Hopfinger, 2000; Ullsperger & 
von Cramon, 2001; Wittfoth, Kustermann, Fahle, & Herrmann, 2008). Deze 
relatie is in overeenstemming met de connecties van de pMPFC naar motor 
output. Ventrale delen van de pMPFC zijn immers meer gerelateerd aan de 
primaire motor cortex en het ruggenmerg, terwijl dorsale gedeelten meer 
gerelateerd zijn aan hersen gebieden die betrokken zijn in hogere orde 
cognitie (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 
2004). Aangezien fouten de correcte respons zullen uitlokken, is het 
plausibel dat ze meer gerelateerd zijn aan gebieden die gecorreleerd zijn met 
motor output dan respons conflict.   
OVER HET RESPONS NIVEAU HEEN: TAAK CONFLICT EN TAAK 
FOUTEN 
Tot hier toe hebben we literatuur beschreven omtrent fouten en 
conflict op een respons niveau. Conflict komt echter niet alleen voor op een 
respons niveau maar ook op een taak niveau. Verrassend genoeg is de 
literatuur rond taak conflict volledig geïsoleerd van literatuur rond respons 
conflict. Taak conflict is namelijk uitvoerig bestudeerd geweest met een 
andere klasse van paradigma’s, namelijk taak afwisselingsparadigma’s 
(Monsell, 2003). In deze paradigma’s voeren proefpersonen twee taken uit 
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in een random of voorgeprogrammeerde volgorde. Een typische bevinding 
in dit onderzoek is een vertraging en slechtere prestatie op een taak wissel in 
vergelijking met een taak herhaling, de zogenaamde wisselkost (e.g., 
Monsell, 2003). Op neuraal vlak zijn verschillende hersen gebieden in een 
fronto-parietaal netwerk geassocieerd met taak afwisseling (Brass & von 
Cramon, 2002; Crone, Wendelken, Donohue, & Bunge, 2006; Dove, 
Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000; Hyafil, Summerfield, & 
Koechlin, 2009; Ruge, Brass, Koch, Rubin, Meiran, & von Cramon, 2005; 
Rushworth, Hadland, Paus, & Sipila, 2002).  
DE VERKEERDE TAAK VOORBEREIDEN OF UITVOEREN: DE INVLOED OP 
SWITCH EFFECTEN 
Hoewel er dus onderzoek bestaat naar respons fouten, respons 
conflict en taak conflict heeft tot onze verbazing geen enkele studie de 
neurale correlaten van taak fouten bestudeerd. In deze doctoraatsthesis 
vullen we deze lacune op. In hoofdstuk twee ontwikkelden we een design 
waarin taak fouten, taak conflict, respons fouten en respons conflict konden 
onderzocht worden. We voerden twee manipulaties in om het aantal respons 
en taak fouten te verhogen. Om respons fouten te verhogen presenteerden 
we flanker stimuli aan beide zijden van de target stimulus. Respons tijden 
waren korter op congruente dan op incongruente flanker trials. Echter, het 
aantal respons fouten werd niet beïnvloed door de flanker manipulatie. 
Ondanks dit laatste, vonden we over het experiment heen een voldoende 
aantal respons fouten (10%). Taak fouten werden effectief verhoogd door 
een taak wissel aan te bieden tijdens de trial. Meer specifiek, wanneer we 
een wissel cue na de verschijning van de stimulus presenteerden, werden 
meer taak fouten gemaakt dan wanneer proefpersonen niet moesten wisselen 
van taak tijdens de trial. Met dit paradigma repliceerden we de 
gedragseffecten die eerder gevonden werden voor taak en respons fouten. 
Net zoals Steinhauser en Hübner (2006), observeerden we wissel voordelen 
in plaats van wissel kosten na een taak fout. Deze bevinding werd verklaard 
door voornoemde auteurs door te stellen dat respons uitvoering de huidige 
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taak activaties versterkt. Met andere woorden, wanneer een taak fout 
gemaakt wordt, wordt de verkeerde taak versterkt. Dit zal leiden tot een 
voordeel op de volgende trial (aangezien de vorige versterkte taak opnieuw 
wordt aangeboden). In additie toonden we aan dat niet enkel de uitgevoerde 
taak maar ook een taak die enkel voorbereid is, leidt tot wissel effecten op 
een volgende trial. Dit is een belangrijke bevinding aangezien de meeste 
taak afwisselingsstudies exclusief focussen op de rol van de uitgevoerde 
taak op volgende wissel kosten (e.g., Philipp, Jolicoeur, Falkenstein, & 
Koch, 2007; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2006).  
NEUROLOGISCHE CORRELATEN VAN FOUTEN EN CONFLICT OP HET 
TAAK EN HET RESPONS NIVEAU 
 In hoofdstuk drie gebruikten we het paradigma ontwikkeld in 
hoofdstuk twee om de neurale correlaten geassocieerd met taak fouten en 
taak conflict te vergelijken met die van respons conflict en respons fouten. 
We vonden dat verschillende subregio’s van de pMPFC gecorreleerd waren 
met taak fouten, taak conflict, respons fouten en respons conflict. Een 
overzicht van de verschillende activaties in de pMPFC kan teruggevonden 
worden in Figuur 1. Het gebied geactiveerd door respons conflict (in BA 8) 
is in lijn met de gebieden gerapporteerd in de literatuur (voor een overzicht 
zie Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Respons fouten waren geassocieerd met 
activatie in BA 8 - BA 9. Hoewel deze activatie dorsaler en meer anterieur is 
dan de activatie die normaal gerapporteerd wordt, repliceert het onderscheid 
tussen respons conflict en respons fouten eerdere bevindingen. Respons 
conflict activeerde namelijk meer dorsale en posterieur delen dan respons 
fouten (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004). Taak 
conflict activeerde meer posterieure gebieden (preSMA) van de pMPFC 
zoals reeds werd gevonden in eerdere studies (Brass & von Cramon, 2002; 
Crone et al., 2006; Rushworth et al., 2002). Voor het eerst werden ook 
neurale correlaten voor taak fouten gerapporteerd. Taak fouten activeerden 
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een subregio van de pMPFC die anterieur ligt ten opzichte van de preSMA 
en dorsaal ten opzichte van de RCZ.  
 
Figuur 1. Midden sagittaal zicht van de pMPFC. Dit gebied wordt begrensd door de VCA lijn 
en de AC-PC lijn. Twee subregio’s van de pMPFC zijn aangeduid; preSMA in het groen en 
RCZ in het blauw. Brodmann arealen zijn aangeduid met hun overeenkomstige nummers. 
Piek coördinaten in de pMPFC gerelateerd aan taak fouten (TF), taak conflict (TC), respons 
fouten (RF) en respons conflict (RC) zijn aangeduid met blauwe vierkanten. Verder is de 
activatie gerelateerd aan respons fouten in de preSMA aangeduid door middel van een groen 
vierkant. Activatie gerelateerd aan de observatie van fouten en onverwachte gebeurtenissen is 
aangeduid met een oranje vierkant (OF).  
 
We noemden dit gebied de dorsale frontomediane cortex (dFMC). Eén 
activatie is niet in overeenstemming met het dorsaal-ventraal en anterieur-
posterieur onderscheid in de pMPFC. We vonden namelijk ook een dorsale 
activatie (in de preSMA) voor respons fouten (aangeduid door een groen 
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vierkant in Figuur 1). Dit kan te maken hebben met het feit dat respons 
fouten uitgelokt zijn door een wissel manipulatie. Activatie gerelateerd aan 
respons fouten kan dus enerzijds een wissel proces (gereflecteerd door de 
preSMA activiteit) en anderzijds een foutgerelateerd proces weergeven 
(gereflecteerd door de ventrale activatie in de pMPFC).     
Het gebied dat we vonden voor taak fouten, namelijk de dFMC, 
werd eerder reeds beschreven in hogere orde beslissingsprocessen (Elliott & 
Dolan, 1998; Goel & Dolan, 2000; Rushworth et al., 2002; Volz, Schubotz, 
& von Cramon, 2003; Volz, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2004). Hierop verder 
bouwend en de verschillende connecties van de pMPFC naar motor output 
in het achterhoofd houdend, kunnen we concluderen dat abstractere fouten 
in meer dorsale regio’s van de pMPFC verwerkt worden.  
FOUT EN CONFLICT VERWERKING IN HET LABORATORIUM 
Tot nu toe heb ik een overzicht gegeven van de studies over conflict 
en foutverwerking op het respons niveau en op het taak niveau. Bijna al deze 
studies gebruikten heel simpele taken met een gelimiteerde ecologische 
validiteit. Zoals hierboven beschreven zijn conflict en fouten doorgaans 
bestudeerd in verschillende spatiale en non-spatiale compatibiliteitstaken, 
zoals de flanker taak (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), de Stroop taak (Macleod, 
1991; Stroop, 1935) en de Simon taak (Simon, 1969). Zelfs al is een brede 
waaier aan paradigma’s gebruikt, adaptief gedrag in deze taken is 
gelimiteerd tot een heel specifieke strategie. Na een fout in de flanker taak 
bijvoorbeeld, is de enige mogelijke strategie om de fout in de toekomst te 
vermijden, meer aandacht te besteden aan de centrale pijl. Echter, in vele 
situaties in het dagelijkse leven, zal een fout niet alleen een verhoging in 
aandacht veroorzaken maar ook een informatieve rol spelen. Wanneer we 
bijvoorbeeld een nieuwe vaardigheid aanleren zoals dansen of het bespelen 
van een muziekinstrument is het heel cruciaal om onze fouten te analyseren. 
Meer bepaald moeten we uitzoeken wat fout is gegaan om deze fout in de 
toekomst te kunnen vermijden. Dit leeraspect gaat verloren in typische 
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laboratorium taken aangezien daar niet veel te leren valt. Als gevolg, kunnen 
huidige theorieën rond fout en conflict verwerking, de cognitieve operaties 
die gerelateerd zijn aan foutverwerking onderschatten.  
In hoofdstuk vier hebben we dit probleem aangepakt door na-
effecten van fouten en conflict te bestuderen in een cognitief uitdagendere 
taak, namelijk hoofdrekenen. Naast de typisch geobserveerde vertraging na 
een fout, vonden we ook evidentie voor een verbetering in performantie na 
een fout. Hier tonen we dus aan dat één van de redenen waarom verbetering 
na een fout niet altijd teruggevonden wordt, ligt aan de te restrictieve set van 
gedragsaanpassingen in laboratorium taken.  
Verder vonden we geen evidentie voor conflictadaptatie in 
hoofdrekenen. Dit is in lijn met onze voorspellingen en komt overeen met de 
‘adaptatie door binding’ account (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). Volgens deze 
account leiden situaties van conflict tot arousal. Deze toestand van arousal 
zorgt dan voor een versterking van de actieve taak representaties. Voor onze 
data betekent dit dat de versterking van een bepaalde multiplicatie (e.g., 4 x 
6 = 30) niet zal leiden tot een verbeterde performantie op een andere 
multiplicatie (e.g., 7 x 8 = 49).  
HET OBSERVEREN VAN FOUTEN 
Het laatste hoofdstuk van deze dissertatie focust op fout observatie. 
Recent neuro-wetenschappelijk onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat hetzelfde 
gebied dat betrokken is in foutverwerking, namelijk de pMPFC 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004), ook actief is 
wanneer we fouten van anderen observeren. (de Bruijn, de Lange, von 
Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2009; Manthey, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2004; 
Newman-Norlund, Ganesh, van Schie, de Bruijn, & Bekkering, 2009; Shane, 
Stevens, Harenski, & Kiehl, 2008). Het uitvoeren en het observeren van 
fouten steunen dus op dezelfde neurale mechanismen. Tot nu toe blijft het 
echter onduidelijk wat de reden voor dit gedeeld mechanisme is. Gedeelde 
activatie voor observatie en executie werd eerder gerapporteerd voor acties 
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in het algemeen (voor een overzicht zie Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Van 
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Een invloedrijke theorie die hieruit 
voortvloeide stelt dat we acties van anderen begrijpen door middel van 
interne motor simulatie (Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, 
Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 2005; Rizzolati & Craighero, 2004; Rizolatti, 
Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). Wanneer we fout observatie als een specifiek 
onderdeel van actie observatie bekijken, is het heel aanlokkelijk om te 
veronderstellen dat we ook elk anders fouten simuleren en dat we daarom 
dezelfde gebieden activeren bij fout observatie en fout executie. In 
hoofdstuk vijf hebben we deze predictie getest door hersen activiteit 
geassocieerd met de observatie van fouten die kunnen gesimuleerd worden 
te vergelijken met hersen activiteit van fouten die niet kunnen gesimuleerd 
worden. In het bijzonder hebben we hersen activatie gemeten terwijl 
proefpersonen dagelijkse mens-machine interacties waarnemen die 
resulteren in correcte of foute situaties. De reden voor deze fouten konden 
tweevoudig zijn. Ten eerste, kon de mens de fout veroorzaken door de 
machine verkeerd te gebruiken. Ten tweede, kon de fout veroorzaakt worden 
door een malfunctie van de machine. We toonden aan dat de pMPFC geen 
onderscheid maakte tussen fouten uitgelokt door mensen of door machines. 
Hiermee vonden we dus geen evidentie voor de simulatiehypothese. We 
vonden zelfs de meest uitgebreide activatie wanneer een niet foutieve 
onverwachte gebeurtenis op het scherm verscheen. Hiermee tonen onze data 
een bredere rol aan voor de pMPFC, namelijk het detecteren van opvallende 
gebeurtenissen.  
Verder activeerde de observatie van menselijke fouten gebieden die 
betrokken zijn in visuele verwerking en actie begrip zoals de inferieure 
parietale kwab en de laterale occipitotemporale cortex. Dit reflecteert dat de 
observatie van menselijke fouten een versterkte activatie teweegbrengt in 
gebieden gerelateerd aan de visuele verwerking van lichaamsgerelateerde 
karakteristieken.  
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CONCLUSIE 
In deze thesis toon ik aan dat resultaten verkregen in experimenteel 
onderzoek beïnvloed kunnen zijn door steeds dezelfde restrictieve set van 
paradigma’s te gebruiken. Ten eerste vinden we een dissociatie in de 
pMPFC wanneer fouten en conflict op een verschillend niveau worden 
gemeten. Ten tweede, tonen we aan dat de gedragseffecten die extensief 
beschreven werden in de literatuur verschillend zijn van deze gemeten in 
een meer ecologisch valide taak. Ten slotte tonen we aan dat de pMPFC niet 
alleen gerelateerd is aan de observatie van fouten maar ook aan de 
observatie van onverwachte verrassende gebeurtenissen. Samengevat, 
kunnen we concluderen dat adaptieve controle onderzocht moet worden op 
verschillende niveaus in een bredere range van taken en dat fout observatie 
onderzoek niet enkel moet focussen op menselijke fouten. 
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